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# **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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28 January 1993

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**Bosnian Serb Commander on 'Honor Code'**

93BA0483A Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI  
in Serbo-Croatian 6 Dec 92 p 9

[Interview with Colonel Slavko Lisica, Tactical Group 3 commander, by Davorin Reljic; place and date not given: "The Honor Code Is the Strongest Weapon"]

[Text] [Reljic] Colonel, it really is no simple matter to prepare a journalist's question and put it to you. Not because there are no topics or reader interest, but because you are well-known as an interesting interviewer's subject, a person who is a bit "complicated" and not only answers questions, but also asks them.

[Lisica] That's right! Lisica does raise many questions and seeks answers to them. A great deal has been said and written about the dilettantes who only shoot and demolish things with artillery shells. But Lisica simply "walked right into" the point where the resistance was firmest. Not possible, it will not happen. At least not in my time. Tactical Group 3, which I command, has stood only for the truth. The political game has not been of interest to us. Were it different, I would not be sitting here today in a building "under a slab." But that does not bother me. Without ethics, without morality, what do we need with a state? You cannot have a situation in which anyone can shoot, can go into a dwelling and issue orders. There is law, and only the law!

[Reljic] Orthodoxy is often mentioned as an essential and fundamental force in our defensive war.

[Lisica] Orthodoxy is the only religion which has not been "taken advantage of." In the operation of liberating Kupres, when we reached the center of the city, there were 48 prisoners there. Among them was one young man covered with blood. He admitted that he had taken part in massacres. The people massacred also included the brother of one of my soldiers, a reservist. His brother had been massacred alive! And he, this reservist of mine, for whom that prisoner was a war criminal, said "I cannot kill him to avenge myself." Why not, I said, when he killed your brother so savagely? And he said, "I cannot be his judge!" For me, he stood tall at that moment. I am in awe of that ancient Orthodox integrity.

[Reljic] The war into which we were drawn, which was imposed on us, has the characteristics of an interethnic, religious, civil...

[Lisica] I have seen this as a fight against fascism, Ustashism, and Green Berets, as the worst form of it. And I chose for myself assistants and fellow workers who are able humanists. Every one of them could also be a poet. The Muslim people of Islamic faith can only be Serbian or Croatian. But socialism ruined us. Social justice will, of course, always be relevant. When we really know the value of money and draft documents with the pen of the state, and letters to our spouses and relatives exclusively with our own private pen, only then will we get beyond all those remnants of the feudal-type socialism! One should be practical even in warfare. In Bosanski Kobas, I told the Muslims: If you do not join the Serbs, that is, the Orthodox, you are making a mistake. And we formed the Mesa Selimovic Volunteer Unit. What I was after was not to form a unit that would "decide the war," but to keep us from wrestling with one

another in the woods and later sitting down together to resolve our common problem. As far as the various truces are concerned, you know that I am a soldier and I never trust anyone. The Ustashi least of all! In the history of warfare, there has never been such an army as the political HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] Ustasha army which has been destroying everything. That is why we can assume that they can always cross the Sava. This is a religious war, and our task is to take up arms with a helmet on our head!

[Reljic] What should the Serbian state be like, at least from the standpoint of military geography?

[Lisica] Great mistakes have been made over the last 50 years and over the last 100 years. I think that Pasic's Yugoslavia, which was cut short, was the right version. Five million people died for the creation of Yugoslavia. But we think it is better to "go to heaven" than first to build a good foundation with laws of this world. I think that we are wrong if we think that peace is when someone tells us it is and that we should only wage war.

People will be looking for work, but where are they going to work if we destroy things senselessly? What I am in favor of is not destruction, but rather let the village go to whoever is stronger and wiser. Of course, you cannot be the strongest on all fronts. I am against the destruction of bridges, cities, and houses. That is why the use of the army must also be appropriate and well-planned. I offered myself for commander of the Doboj region so that I could help in the creation of all the Serbian lands and the Orthodox population in one state. And that state—a modest one—was historically defined for all practical purposes practically since the Battle of Kosovo, since the Obrenovices, the Karadjordjevic... I am convinced that the antifascists, led by the Serbs and the Orthodox, cannot lose a war, because they are on the side of justice. The war will not be won either by Alija Izetbegovic or Franjo Tudjman. After all, we may be slow, but we will do what we will do, regardless of the restrictions, the bans, and the threats.

[Reljic] You are also well-known as a fierce fighter for the moral code, ethics, and integrity.

[Lisica] You know, we were on the offensive in the direction of Livno, and that did not succeed at that time. There are those who tried to turn even a failure into a success. My thinking is you did not succeed, you did not! It is a pity that I lost six men at that time. Aleksandar Ivanovic, one of my fighting men, was killed. He had no relatives here, and his mother was somewhere in Germany. They did not know what to do. I issued the order—send his body to my mother Zorka in Laminci. For him to be buried with full honors.

Nevertheless, his mother did send word. Even when my soldier dies, I must not leave him. Getting killed is something that can happen both to him and to me, but no one is to be left to the enemy! Death is a part of life, and it all revolves in a single flow. We all have a need to be buried like human beings. Perhaps I am an idealist. But for me every home is a shrine. This is where children are born. It should not be disturbed in any way. After all, one day justice must triumph. We Orthodox must be broad. When it all began, I remember we were taking a walk in Knin, and we joked: In the Croatian forest, the air is Croatian, now it is Serbian, breathe in now! Elderly Croats remained behind in Novo Selo. I issued an order that they must not

**BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA**

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be touched! What difference does it make which side they are on—they are old people. For me, this is the moral code! That is what we have and what we must strengthen. And they (the enemies) will always hate us precisely because we are honorable and broad. In Kupres, one officer wanted us to shoot the prisoners, but Kofilovski was against it. I asked who captured the enemy soldiers? Kofilovski said: I did! Then it will be the way the one who captured them

says. And the prisoners remained alive thanks to Kofilovski. As far as I am concerned as an officer, there was never any forgiving of sins for criminals. There can be no retreats and concessions. Put aside your weapons, and the court will decide the extent of the guilt! In prison until the verdict is rendered. When he could start a war, then he can handle prison. I am not going to be a judge, nor would I be able to fight for a religious state.

**Leader of National Radical Party Interviewed**

93BA0417A Sofia ZORA in Bulgarian 8 Dec 92 p 10

[Unattributed interview with Dr. Ivan Georgiev, chairman of the Bulgarian National Radical Party; place and date not given: "Anything That Is Good for Bulgaria Is Good"]

[Text] *The profound economic, political, and moral crisis that struck our Fatherland demands today, more than at any other time, the unification of the nation. This is a mandatory prerequisite for its survival. ZORA has always offered its pages to Bulgarian political leaders who support our national cause. Dr. Ivan Georgiev, chairman of the Bulgarian National Radical Party [BNRP], is one of the few politicians today who for decades has waged an irreconcilable struggle against the totalitarian communist system and the national nihilism that was preached by its leaders. With this interview, requested by many of our readers, we lift the blackout of information imposed by some forces on a party that is truly operating on the Bulgarian political stage.*

[ZORA] Dr. Georgiev, what is your view on the present situation in Bulgaria from the viewpoint of the BNRP and, in general, the Bulgarian national interests?

[Georgiev] Not based on the viewpoint of the BNRP but quite objectively today Bulgaria is experiencing one of the most critical periods in its 1,300-year-old history. We are on the threshold of 1993. However, ever more insistently a high percentage of Bulgarian far-sighted political personalities turn their minds back to the year 1393. Narrow-mindedness, egotism, selfishness, and divisiveness greatly shorten historical memory and make it possible for a nation to experience a terrible cataclysm, thus facing future generations with indescribable torture.

For 48 years Bulgaria was headed by people who had nothing in common with the national traditions of their nation. Both the Red and the Blue communists are destroying the national awareness of our people. They are trying to eliminate the people's identity and to destroy the state structures along with the economy and industry. It is only a nation in a state of poverty and misery that could be brought down on its knees. The present National Assembly consists of incompetent and incapable people who have taken the path making their political careers not for the sake of developing the well-being of our people and country but motivated by their selfish ambitions and desire for personal benefits. These are the people of the second echelon of the former BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] who, for lack of personal qualities, were unable to reach the top of the Communist Party before 10 November 1989 and who today, speculating on the anticommunist feelings of the people, and misleading them by pretending that they are engaged in some kind of reform without changing the old system, are hastening to complete the plundering of the already plundered Bulgarian nation and to export the national wealth abroad.

It is those same people who are totally removing the fences protecting the Bulgarian state. The purpose of the census that has now been started is to present Bulgaria to the world as a mosaic of a great variety of ethnic groups: Turks, Gypsies, Wallachians, Tatars, Macedonians, Bulgarian Muslims, Jews, Armenians, and Bulgarians. The result of this will be that the Bulgarians who live in Bulgaria are nothing other than one of the many ethnic groups. That is

precisely why the BNRP appeals to anyone whose family roots are Bulgarian to boycott the census and to refuse to fill in the census forms. This census has been inspired by external forces hostile to Bulgarianism and whose purpose is the total destruction of our country. Defeated and unprotected, in that case Bulgaria would become easy prey to the ambitious hegemonic plans of our southern neighbor.

Today Bulgarians are being hit by unparalleled denationalization tolerated by the official authorities of the Presidency and the National Assembly. The national dignity and honor of the Bulgarians is being eroded, their ties with their past are being broken, their history is being falsified worse than ever before, and their symbols and idols are being discredited. It is only morally degraded people who can claim that the Haidouk spirit in our country was a manifestation of banditry, that the janissaries enhanced the cultural standards of our people, that the mosques that were built were architectural monuments, that there was no Turkish slavery but Ottoman presence, that the April uprising was a local riot, that Vasil Levski was an alcoholic and a bandit, and so on and so forth. Hundreds of thousands of Bulgarian patriots sacrificed their lives for our liberation from the most terrible slavery—Turkish slavery—known in the history of mankind. Today the national traitors who are selling out our homeland to its enemies without a fight deprive the lives and actions of such people of their meaning, desecrate their memory, and mock their blood.

We, the national radicals, consider ourselves the heirs and continuators of their cause. If we want to live a worthy life on our own land and be proud of our Bulgarian name, we must struggle with our entire awareness and energy against such destructive processes. We must not allow this!

[ZORA] In such an abnormal situation, what should be the role of the nonparliamentary political forces as a whole and, in particular, of nationalistic circles?

[Georgiev] In this period that is crucial and critical for Bulgaria, the supreme duty and historical imperative of our time is for all political forces, regardless of the coloring of their programs, to rally within a common Bulgarian national front and to save Bulgarianism from destructive processes, at least as far as this bit of land which remains of the great Bulgarian state. Today we must not engage in "politics for the sake of politics." It is only the unification of the nation that can save us and lead us to the safe shore. The time has come for political insanity of division and clashes to yield to the reason of unification. If we wish to keep our conscience clean and unsoiled and not be blamed by future generations, today's political reality makes it necessary for us to classify people not as communists, agrarians, democrats, radicals, and so on, but as Bulgarians and anti-Bulgarians. We, the national radicals, appeal to all Bulgarians to forget their political biases and line up under the great Bulgarian flag in order to save themselves and their Fatherland from the apocalypse programmed for us by centers that are alien and hostile to us. We, nationalists, are profoundly linked with the destinies of our nation. We live with its problems, for which reason we feel most sharply the tragic nature of the present political situation.

[ZORA] You are usually being accused of "extremism" and "intransigence." Of late, however, patriotic circles have

blamed you for failure to act quite aggressively and uncompromisingly against the destroyers of Bulgarian statehood.

[Georgiev] The BNP has not changed its tactics and strategy. It is today the type of political force that is engaged in pursuing a consistent and firm struggle in defense of national Bulgarian interests. The "accusations" you mention are not due to any softening of our political line but to the evolution in the political thinking of increasingly broader strata within our public. The BNP was the party that predicted with exceptional foresight, as early as 1989, the development of political processes in our country and that warned the Bulgarian public of the danger threatening it. At that time, however, our signals failed to reach the awareness of our people. Some circles serving foreign interests tried to develop a negative attitude toward us, accusing us of "extremism" and "intransigence," as well as lack of political flexibility, extremism, communism, fascism, and other such things. Today, having their hopes destroyed by the three "free" elections, tired of the chaos, disorder, lack of promise for the future, finding themselves in the hands of speculators and criminals, without any guarantee concerning their lives, honor and property, deprived of legality, disbelieving the power of the present National Assembly, facing the harsh economic and social crisis, the people are beginning painfully to realize that it was not any extreme or narrow-party interests that made the BNP ring its warning bells warning of the forthcoming danger. The creation of parties on an ethnic or religious ground is providing new prerequisites for tension and conflicts among various social strata and is opening the way to the outbreak of civil war. This is being intuitively felt by the ordinary Bulgarian people with an increasing sense of tragedy. In seeking peace, order, tranquility, and social justice, such Bulgarians see precisely the BNP as a guarantor of its future, a party with the clearest possible program concerning national, economic, and social problems. The BNP has not stopped struggling with means consistent with the political situation for even a single moment in its political activities, against those who are destroying Bulgarian statehood. That is why it is winning over a growing share of the political space in our country.

[ZORA] The BNP has no deputies but has several mayors and hundreds of opština municipal councilors. How are their activities manifested?

[Georgiev] The increasing influence of the BNP in Bulgarian sociopolitical life is shaking up the ruling leadership in our country, which is pursuing an antinational policy. That is why it is trying to isolate the BNP and put it in a state of total information blackout. We, the national radicals, have no access to the mass information media, to "national" television and radio. Nothing is being said about our political actions; we are not allowed access to broadcasting. That is why we must alone popularize our objectives and tasks, our platform, and our program. In such activities our structures in the local public councils, such as our opština councilors and our mayors, are providing invaluable service. In lifting the information curtain we organize

subscriptions throughout the country and are opening the eyes of the people concerning our intentions. The ordinary Bulgarians understand us. We no longer encounter the prejudice developed in them by the anti-Bulgarian forces. We are pleased by this. Whereas earlier we claimed that the future belongs to us, considering our huge youth membership, now we can boldly say that at present "this is our time," for all strata disappointed in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and SDS [Union of Socialist Forces] are seeking a way to join us, having sharply felt personally the social blows of the "reform."

[ZORA] In a pre-electoral situation, is the BNP internally ready for a new and perhaps even more difficult electoral campaign?

[Georgiev] The political crisis, which is the consequence of the economic and social dislocation, is forcing our rulers to become aware of their instability. The breakdown of forces in that parliament deprives it of the possibility of making any constructive decisions whatsoever for the good of our people. Aware of the fact that with new elections our people will clean up from the National Assembly all such sterile individuals, they frighten the people with premature elections without mentioning that this threat applies exclusively to the so-called "national representatives." Our people indeed need new elections and give their trust to the kind of pragmatic and competent individuals who would be able to take them out of dislocation and would guarantee their social and national progress. In the first elections for the Grand National Assembly the BNP garnered no more than 3,800 votes; in the second elections, 63,000 people voted for it; today it hopes to rally no less than 300,000-400,000 votes. The more people vote for the BNP, free from the psychological fear imposed by the 4-percent barrier, the more securely will the prosperity of the Bulgarian Nation become guaranteed. The national radicals are ready to struggle against all difficulties and obstacles erected in front of them by the enemies of Bulgarian nationhood.

[ZORA] With what and with whom could you make political compromises, and what compromises are impossible?

[Georgiev] In accordance with political reality, within a specific time framework, and depending on the tactical objectives and tasks it must resolve, the BNP is looking for strategic allies and is ready to give a hand to all political forces that sincerely work for the Bulgarian national interests. To this day we do not avoid participation in any forum, providing that it does not conflict with the civic and national conscience of the national radicals. Proceeding from our concept that anything that is good for Bulgaria is good we are prepared to compromise with political and social organizations with which we could jointly seek a way to the well-being of all Bulgarians in Mysia, Dobrudzha, Macedonia, and Thrace, which are age-old Bulgarian historical areas. We can never compromise with our national conscience, and, in accordance with the political situation, we shall continue to wage in the future as well an uncompromising hard struggle in defense of Bulgarian national interests.

So that Bulgaria may remain part of the world!

### New Tax Effects on Private Business Viewed

93CH0239A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech  
18 Dec 92 p 9

[Article by Marika Konecna, of the College of Economics: "Who Gets 20 Billion in Tax Savings?—No One Calculated Total Burden on Different Businesses"]

[Text] The year 1993 brings fundamental change in the entire tax system. The business community is taking a look at the information made public thus far on a general lowering of the tax burden for the business sphere in the amount of 20 billion korunas [Kcs]. It also expects extension of the presently available system of measures to support business starts.

The public has also learned information on the current methods of taxing small and medium-sized businesses in a number of countries with a market economy where there exist reduced rates for taxing corporations [pravnicke osoby] (for instance in the United States, the rate is 15 percent; in Great Britain, 25 percent; in Japan, 12 percent). But despite positive expectations certain types of businesses have found reality much less favorable and for many of them even depressing. The situation suggests that no calculation has been made of the overall burden on the small-business sphere according to the different kinds of entrepreneurs.

#### Taxing Incomes of Private Individuals

The main problem is introduction of insurance payments to three funds (social security fund, employment fund, and health insurance fund) and the method of making payments to them. The public is not sufficiently clear about the purpose of the payment at the moment partial payment is required toward the cost of prescriptions as well as medical services. The explanation offered by Health Minister Petr Lom (LIDOVE NOVINY, 1 December 92) on the need to fund health insurance companies, raising the value of the point and giving a signal to banks to offer loans to the health industry, is far from reassuring. The insurance rate system is not founded on risk evaluation and the insured's choice, but rather set as a mandated contribution. These contributions become a variable tax on income.

In essence a taxable business income up to Kcs1,080,000 of taxable base is regarded as a sum allocated to personal consumption. No consideration is given to paying off credits, new investments, return on moneys spent on modernization, expansion of operating capital, and the like. Moreover, despite the hefty increase in premiums benefits from health insurance as well as income insurance are strictly limited (for instance to Kcs190 in sickness benefit per day).

Another problem resulted from assuming that self-employed individuals are at the same time their own employees and employers and that they must pay insurance premiums by global rate, that is the sum of all separate rates. This is essentially double taxation of the same subject. Closer to reality is the assumption that the entrepreneur is an employer without employees, or an employee without an employer. The result is that:

- Health insurance premiums are set at 13.5 percent of the assessed base which in the first year of business

operation set at 24 times the minimum wage (Kcs52,800) and the premiums are payable by monthly installments of no less than Kcs594 regardless of the actual proceeds of the enterprise throughout the period. Those already engaged in business pay 13.5 percent of one-twelfth of profit (revenues after deducting costs) for the past calendar year from the minimum base of Kcs52,000 up to Kcs540,000. Thus the insurance premiums can amount to as much as Kcs72,900 annually, i.e., Kcs6,075 per month. This while the actual proceeds from the business may differ substantially from what was anticipated or realized in the past year and there may even be a case when an entrepreneur will make substantial advance payments to the insurance fund for an entire year until the next tax filing.

- Payments of social insurance premiums proceed from a similar logic but of course a somewhat different base (Kcs2,200 minimum, must not be less than one-half of the taxable base up to Kcs1,080,000 maximum. Thus the assessed base is between Kcs1,100 and 540,000). The entrepreneur's rate is set at 36 percent and the premiums may reach as high as Kcs194,400 annually, that is, Kcs16,200 per month. Compared with the present possible payments of Kcs6,000 annually this is more than a 30-fold increase. Minimum mandated payments for all contributions to the insurance funds amount to Kcs990 and have almost doubled.

The system which has been adopted means that the minimum payments of all contributions to insurance funds represent for entrepreneurs 31.5 percent of taxable base up to Kcs540,000. In the taxable zone between Kcs540,000 and 1,080,000 the burden is gradually reduced to 24.75 percent. Only then comes the next "official" taxation of profit by means of income tax.

A similar worsening affects the situation in regard to insurance premiums payable for employees. The present 25-percent rate for entrepreneurs—private individuals—has been merged with the rates for legal entities and raised to 36 percent—by 11 points, or an additional 44 percent of costs connected with live labor. In more labor-intensive businesses this again means substantial discrimination.

The 44-percent increase in insurance premiums for employees combined with premiums for the employer's own insurance which may reach up to Kcs267,300 annually has a serious impact on the economics of private entrepreneurs—private individuals. It may lead to inability to pay off credits, worsen the firm's liquidity, and siphon off a significant portion of earned profit. It is certain that for this category of entrepreneurs the policy will mean a brake on investment activity and at the same time exert a negative influence on employment growth. A negative political impact can similarly be taken for granted.

The overall burden on the incomes of entrepreneurs—private individuals—thus ranges in various brackets (without deductible items) from a minimum of 41.5 percent up to 59.75 percent. These rates make the situation worse than in 1992 when the top rate on a taxable base over Kcs1,080,000

was 55 percent. But it has a far more negative impact on all incomes in the lower brackets of the taxable base.

### Taxing Incomes of Legal Entities

In regard to income tax the more advantageous 20-percent rate on incomes up to Kcs200,000 was abolished; furthermore, there will no longer be a system of income tax abatements designed to support certain activities and services involving low profitability and productivity and requiring more live labor—see appendix to Decree No. 193/1989 of the GAZETTE (custom-made products and short series not exceeding 500 pieces, custom-made underwear and clothing, custom-made footwear (in particular orthopedic footwear), sign painting and glazier work, public catering, repairs and maintenance, personal transportation, a number of services).

The existing system of abatements tied the share of reduced operations in selected activities to reduced operations overall. The amount of abatement was restricted by the profit earned. After applying the rebate it was possible to reduce the 55-percent income tax rate by as much as 30 points. There is also the end to more favorable taxation of joint ventures (increase from 40 to 45 percent). For write-offs of material assets the uniform rate of 20 percent no longer applies to write-offs of basic machine equipment in enterprises with fewer than 100 employees.

Income tax payers were simultaneously subject to tax on wages. The rate for tax on wages was 50 percent of the taxable base. It was of course set differently for some of the entrepreneurial entities. For the perspective of small and midsized enterprises this meant in particular:

- A 20-percent rate for taxpayers providing services stipulated by an implementing regulation (as in the case of income tax abatements according to an appendix to decree No. 193/1989 of the GAZETTE),

and this in relation to the volume of wages applicable to these activities.

- A 10-percent rate for production cooperatives of invalids and for enterprises and business establishments of the Association of Invalids, as also for private individuals carrying on private enterprise and employing primarily persons with diminished work ability. Then too for other taxpayers (with a 50- or 20-percent tax rate) there existed a system of abatements for employing predominantly persons with diminished work ability which could reduce the tax or wage levy to as little as 10 percent of the wage volume.

The newly established uniform rate for employers of 36 percent of wages paid is therefore advantageous for taxpayers subject to the former 50-percent tax or levy on the volume of wages paid who do not employ invalids. These are primarily manufacturing enterprises (with the exception of piece or short-series production), construction enterprises (with the exception of sign painting, glazier and framing work, operation and administration of communications), commercial enterprises (with the exception of complementary catering and consumer service). These businesses will see their burden reduced by 14 points, that is, 28 percent. Other entrepreneurs will face an increase in payments connected with the cost of live labor from 20 to 36 percent, that is, 16 points or 80 percent, in some cases from 10 to 36 percent, that is, 26 points or 260 percent. For enterprises whose costs consist predominantly of wages this means discriminatory treatment.

The unfavorable situation can become more pronounced due to the impossibility to raise productivity by making use of better technologies (especially in the crafts and services) and at the same time to the limited opportunities to project the increased burden of financial imposts into prices in cases where a surge of demand exists. The principal barrier to small business in 1993 is fiscal in nature. The small private sector will for the most part not be among the beneficiaries of the intended lowering of the tax burden.

### Example

*An entrepreneur with an annual taxable base of Kcs800,000 employing eight persons with an average monthly wage of Kcs5,000*

Accounting and Tax Items	1992	1993
Estimated tax base without insurance	800,000	800,000
Insurance—entrepreneur	6,000	216,900
Insurance—employees	120,000	172,000
Deductible	14,400	20,400
Taxable base reduced by insurance and deductible	659,600	390,700
Income tax	218,820	103,424
Net profit	440,780	287,276

The difference is Kcs153,504—the entrepreneur loses more than one-third of profit

### Editor's Note

The government this week yielded to pressures from entrepreneurs and is prepared to support an amendment of insurance legislation. This emerged from Tuesday talks between the Association of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs and Czech Republic Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik (see HOSPODARSKE NOVINY of 16 December). If the

amendment is agreed to in the Czech National Council (which should be still before the end of the year), a substantial change will be made in determining the assessed base for the health insurance of self-employed persons and aligning it with the assessed base for social insurance. The assessed base should be newly determined as one-half of income (after deducting the costs of earning it), rather than the present sum total of adjusted income. So if for instance the

original plan was for self-employed persons to pay a minimum of Kcs990 per month for both social and health insurance, the proposed amendment reduces this amount to Kcs693. Thus this category of entrepreneurs would see improvement in their net income, for instance by Kcs5,737 on an annual income of Kcs100,000, by roughly Kcs23,000 on an annual income of Kcs500,000. This would substantially improve the curve of the total burden.

[Box, p 9]

#### For IP & P Shareholders

Before completion of the fifth round of the first wave of coupon privatization the investment company Investice Portfolio a Partner (IP & P) is left with only 6 percent of the investment points it had available. In the fourth round it concentrated primarily on strengthening its position in enterprises in which it had acquired a share already in the earlier rounds.

In almost one-half of the 36 enterprises forming the company's portfolio it gained a more significant share, and in six of them the maximum possible. These are mainly enterprises offering services to motorists, in food trade, public catering, electrical engineering and so on. In line with the current legal requirements the company adjusted the names

of its funds. The trade name of Portfoliov Fond is now Investicni Portfoliov Fond [Investment Portfolio Fund] and Podnikatelsky Fond now has the name Investicni Podnikatelsky Fond [Entrepreneur Investment Fund].

A novelty in the company is a new investment fund with the trade name Investicni Privatni Fond [Private Investment Fund] (all funds are abbreviated as IPF). This fund will assemble moneys and investment points to purchase commercial instruments as well as land, real property and securities.

Because IP & P has increased the fund's base capital, it is currently offering stock which can be purchased by anyone. The price of one share the trading of which will not be restricted in any way is Kcs1,000. For this year the offering will end on 28 December 1992 at the address of the company's managing board. The fund's statute or bylaws will be made available by the company to any interested person.

The new company address for IP & P is 120 00 Praha 2, Pod Karlovem 12, tel. 691 09 48.

—by Jiri Mihola, president, Investment Portfolio & Partners

**Constitutional Lawyer on Referendum Scenarios**

93CH0259A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian  
23 Dec 92 p 4

[Interview with constitutional lawyer Karoly Toth by Andras Gyorgy Lengyel; place and date not given: "Karoly Toth: Dissolving the National Assembly Would Be a Grave Mistake; 'The Constitution Allows Calling a Referendum'"]

[Text] *"Do you want to have the National Assembly dissolved before the end of its term?" asked the signature collectors during the LAET [Society of Those Living Under the Subsistence Level] action. Some experts considered the National Assembly's dissolution through a referendum unconstitutional, citing primarily the fact that our Constitution does not provide for the recall of representatives and that a referendum is nothing but a collective recall. However, Karoly Toth Attila, assistant professor at Attila Jozsef University of Sciences and constitutional lawyer, claims that calling a referendum is not unconstitutional.*

[Lengyel] Do you support your view by political or legal arguments?

[Toth] I have always been nonpartisan, I still am and, therefore, I can state, supported by facts, that the Constitution allows calling a referendum to dissolve the National Assembly before the end of its term. There is no question that the National Assembly, too, may dissolve itself before the end of its term—as is provided by the Constitution. There is only a single limitation, namely, that the National Assembly may not do this in special or emergency situations but, aside from that, the parliament may dissolve itself anytime and for any reason. This right is given to the National Assembly and—in two special instances—to the president of the Republic, meaning that both parliament and the president have the authority to dissolve parliament. This, then, does not fall under the exclusive authority of the National Assembly but is certainly part of its authority. According to Statute 1989/17 on referenda or plebiscites, "A national referendum may be called for matters concerning the strengthening of laws passed by the National Assembly; decisions that fall under the authority of the National Assembly, especially decisions for legislation; definitions of the principles of laws; and decisions concerning issues of national importance that otherwise do not require legislation." The same statute provides that "...no referendum may be called on statutes that deal with the budget, the forms of central taxation and fees, and the central requirements of local taxation; on decisions regarding personal matters that fall under the National Assembly's jurisdiction; on compliance with obligations specified in international agreements; or on the statutes that announce these agreements." The provisions of these two statutes make it clear that self-dissolution falls under the authority of the National Assembly, and since it is a matter of national importance, a referendum may be called even if parliament announces this not in the form of a statute but merely as a resolution.

[Lengyel] However, the so-called personal matters among the reasons for exclusion do warrant attention....

[Toth] That is not the point here. Personal matters include the election and the relieving of officers and other organizations of the National Assembly—e.g., its committees—from among the representatives; the election and the relieving of other external organizations, e.g., the chief

justice of the Supreme Court, the attorney general, or the Constitutional Court; and the determination of incompatibility. Thus, the dissolution of parliament is not considered a decision on a personal matter that falls under the National Assembly's jurisdiction, i.e., the above limitation is not applicable.

[Lengyel] The key question is what the relationship is between the exercise of parliamentary authority and a referendum or, more precisely, whether the results of a referendum are sufficient for dissolving parliament.

[Toth] A referendum is in itself insufficient, and the National Assembly must make the decision. Parliament has the authority to call a referendum. The 100,000 or more signatures merely oblige the National Assembly to call a referendum. Thus, formally, a referendum is held on the basis of a parliamentary decision, even if the latter is the result of the necessary number of signatures that make it compulsory. The situation would be the same if the results of a referendum would demand the dissolution of parliament. In plain language, even in that case, the dissolution would have to be announced by the legislators; the National Assembly's term would not automatically end by the determination of the results of the referendum.

[Lengyel] Some experts say that this type of referendum is unusual in traditional democracies. Is this true?

[Toth] Yes. But there are examples in European practice for not allowing a parliament to permanently function in opposition of the citizens' will or in a way that does not meet the citizens' approval. According to Article 41 of the 1975 Constitution of the Republic of Greece, after hearing the Republican Council, the president of the Republic may dissolve parliament if it functions in obvious disagreement with public mood or if its composition does not guarantee the stability of the government. As a solution to an issue of special national importance, the president of the Republic may dissolve parliament, at the proposal of the government, which enjoys parliament's trust, for the purpose of renewing popular representation. Thus, in the case of at least 100,000 verified signatures, the National Assembly is obligated to call a referendum on the early termination of its term; this is what the viewpoints of constitutional law, constitutionality, and constitutional state dictate.

[Lengyel] What kind of political benefits would such a referendum offer?

[Toth] As a nonpartisan citizen, my opinion is that it would be a grave political mistake if a referendum would be held and, consequently, parliament would be dissolved. The despair of the Society of Those Living Under the Subsistence Level and other people with hardships is understandable, but this brutal legal solution would more likely worsen rather than help their lot. A referendum and a subsequent election would entail horrendous expenses, and human energies would unnecessarily go to waste because the outcome could be highly questionable. Parliament would cease to function because the parties and most representatives would be busy with the campaign, which could possibly even lack any detailed platforms.... Legislation would be interrupted for months.... There would be no guarantee that the first round of elections would be successful. Therefore, I would like to make two proposals. The LAET serves a noble cause, which is to help the poor. In their understandable and

excusable bitterness elicited by the often distasteful criticisms directed against them during their hunger strikes, perhaps they did not think through the possible consequences. They began to collect signatures, and now it seems that there is no return. Although I do not doubt that they will be able to collect several hundred thousand signatures, I think that they should seriously consider the option of collecting fewer than 100,000 signatures and thereby allowing the National Assembly not to call a referendum. Even that way, the moral objective of their action would probably be reached. And, if they do insist on a referendum at all costs, they should consider initiating the so-called consultative form of referendum (i.e., expression of opinions), which does not entail a compulsory dissolution of parliament.

**German Daily: Antall Defeated by Csurka**

93CH0259A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian  
19 Dec 92 p 3

[MTI report on article by Viktor Meier that appeared in the 18 December FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG; page not given: "Antall Has Lost Against Csurka"]

[Text] Viktor Meier wrote in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG's Friday's issue that it seems that the renaissance of "neocommunist tide" is reaching Hungary, too; in the next elections, the reform communists—now calling themselves socialists and led by Gyula Horn—will probably be the ones to draw the biggest benefits from the Hungarian Democratic Forum's [MDF] disintegration.

According to his analysis, the apparent movement in the Hungarian party structure is, to some extent, the result of the MDF's internal struggles. What Jozsef Antall sees in Csurka is not someone who merely threatens party unity but one who also undermines Hungary's prestige abroad and, in view of the MDF Congress in January, he will try to smooth out the "Csurka problem." However, according to Meier, the head of government and party chief is in a losing position. "The dilemma for Antall is great, almost unsolvable," he wrote; perhaps one-third of MDF members belong to the Csurka wing, and Antall will lose the elections without them. On the other hand, the drawback of a compromise that is taking shape in view of the upcoming party congress is that the prime minister will integrate Csurka's concepts both into the MDF and government policies. These prospects gradually ripen a "coalition of the left" of the young democrats, the free democrats, and probably the reform communists. In the writer's opinion, Jozsef Antall defends himself against all this in a way that is, in many people's opinion, not very beneficial; he is oversensitive toward criticism, is constantly fighting the media, and is trying to warm up old issues against the reform communists, e.g., the affair of contributions to the fund of solidarity in Moscow.

**Economic Prospects Called 'Optimistic, Premising'**

**Helmut Schmidt's View**

93CH0253A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian  
22 Dec 92 p 10

[Interview with former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt by Lajos Gubcs in Hamburg; date not given:

"Helmut Schmidt: 'If I Were Hungarian, I Would Have an Optimistic Outlook on the Future'"

[Text] *Helmut Schmidt was chancellor of the German Federal Republic for eight years; his activities have become nearly legendary. It has been 10 years now that he resigned, but the world still listens to what he has to say. The following interview was made in Hamburg, at the editorial office of DIE ZEIT, where Helmut Schmidt still actively participates in the preparation of the newspaper.*

[Gubcs] How do you perceive Hungary's possibilities in the altered international environment? Does it count as a crisis area?

[Schmidt] I always say in my lectures everywhere that among the former communist countries, Hungary's economic development is the most advanced. Today they are ahead of even of the former East Germany. Of course, this cannot last much longer, because we are investing huge financial and technological resources in the former German Democratic Republic [GDR].

[Gubcs] What could this momentary advantage be used for?

[Schmidt] The Hungarians have a lot of good businessmen. However, their future does not depend of their ability, on their efforts within the country, but rather on what is happening in Yugoslavia, Romania, and the separating Czechoslovakia. The Hungarians are a people in a special position, with special talents and culture, for which they are highly respected in the West. And this is also a great capital. In Budapest I feel as if I were in Prague or in Vienna: It is a Central European city.

[Gubcs] We frequently stress that we can play the role of a bridge between East and West. Previously in the area of detente, and now in the transfer of economic expertise, technology, and financial capital.

[Schmidt] In this you are wrong. You cannot fill such a role; certainly not in the next 10 years. I have already mentioned a few countries in a difficult position. But let me enumerate: The Balkans will not calm down for a long time. The questions of Albania and Macedonia are still ahead of us. Bulgaria can become involved because its internal situation is not completely clear. The Romanian development is also confusing. It is questionable whether Slovakia will be able to develop its economy on its own. And let me add: There are large numbers of Hungarian minorities in all these countries. This is also a potential source of tension.

[Gubcs] Still, Western Europe, which hardly knows its way around in this region, could need experienced counsel. Us, for example.

[Schmidt] Not really. The question is namely not whether you are suitable for this role, but rather the solvency of the countries I mentioned before. It will take many years until Western European firms will think that normal business can be conducted. Budapest cannot be solvent for others; it is enough if it is solvent for itself. And if sometime in the future it can construct a bridge, this will not be done by governments and ministries, but by banks, businessmen, and enterprises. The earlier centralized era is over. Western Europe is done with managing the mere survival of governments. It will take a long time for Russia to pay its debts,

and it will only be able to pay with oil and natural gas; but for it to do so, the production of oil and natural gas will have to be restored by investing huge amounts of capital. Could Hungary facilitate and accelerate matters of such dimensions? This is an illusion.

[Gubcsi] The role of German bank and investment capital in Hungary did not meet expectations. Why?

[Schmidt] Because they see better investments elsewhere. Do not continue to expect that the German state will support your transformation with various funds. You have to convince the firms, the banks, that they can make a profit. And you know what? Hungary will have to approach Western Europe with initiatives and projects.

[Gubcsi] Can you help in alleviating the crises you mentioned earlier which also have a detrimental effect on us?

[Schmidt] Not much. Western Europe cannot solve minority tensions. In order to have a hope for peace in Yugoslavia, we would have to send half a million soldiers there and station them there. We will not do that.

[Gubcsi] How can we become part of Western European integration under these circumstances?

[Schmidt] Recently, the currency committee of the European Parliament in Brussels asked me the same question. In my opinion, the former Comecon countries are not competitive in Western Europe. Consequently, the mutual opening of economic gates would ruin you. Something similar would happen as with the auto industry of the GDR. Four weeks after the unification there was no auto industry. It turned into zero. Because old West German cars were much better than new East German ones. Thus, I would not suggest that you accelerate your entry into the Common Market. However, to the countries of the Common Market I suggested that they open their market unilaterally, for instance to Hungary, without demanding that Hungary do the same. In this way, Hungary would have a chance to learn. It could

find out without a dramatic collapse what it could sell and where. This would not be a dreadfully large mass, so don't expect too much.

[Gubcsi] This does not amount to much as far as wishes for Christmas and the new year are concerned....

[Schmidt] Then let me finish the interview with what I have long thought about Hungary: If I were Hungarian, I would have an optimistic outlook on the future.

#### Austrian Paper's View

93CH0253B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian  
22 Dec 92 p 10

[Unattributed article: "DIE PRESSE: Decline Stops in Hungary"]

[Text] In the performance of Hungarian economy expected for next year, the pluses and minuses will be equally distributed—concluded the influential DIE PRESSE in Vienna on Monday. In 1993, Hungarian economy will be subject to a constant alternation of cold and hot showers, the Vienna newspaper writes. The editor of the economy column of the Austrian newspaper credits the Hungarian economy with the fact that according to official data, production in the year which is coming to an end now will only be 5 percent lower than last year, while last year production decreased by 10 percent. He thinks that next year it will be possible to stop this declining trend.

According to the Vienna DIE PRESSE, foreign investments in Hungary have a beneficial effect. Only in the paper manufacturing industry did foreign investors have to write off the money they invested so far as a loss; joint ventures continue to be successful. The Vienna newspaper cites Dr. Stefan Kuzmich, director of the Hungarian subdivision of the Austrian Chamber of Economy, who recommends to Austrian businessmen more than just the prospects of the impending World Exhibition, which promise to be profitable. He adds that in spite of numerous problems which still must be solved, the future prospects of the Hungarian economy continue to be promising.

**Commentary on Women's Involvement in Politics**

93BA0448A Bucharest *DREPTATEA* in Romanian 12  
Dec 92 pp 1,3

[Article by Mariana Sipos: "The Political Participation of Women"]

[Excerpts] The very low level of participation by women in political organizations and their almost total absence from government institutions constitute a sad reality to which Mr. Cornelius Coposu, the president of the PNT-cd [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], has drawn attention more than once, especially after he had an opportunity to compare the situation here with the situation in United States where a large number of women are involved in political life.

The so-called promotion of women during the time of Ceausescu had nothing in common with the feminist movement in the West that demands not only equal rights with men, but rather a reassessment of the masculine world and its values, so that upon entering a domain traditionally reserved for men such as politics, women would not have to give up their own values—values that are considered negative by conservative thinking. Exactly the opposite happened in the case of the women who, along with Elena Ceausescu, took part in Romanian political affairs: They appropriated masculine behavior and strove to do away with any feminine mental characteristic, believing they could thus hide incompetence and lack of talent.

The involvement of women in politics must be of a different order than such examples as Lina Ciobanu or Alexandrina Gainusa [Ceausescu regime officials]. For all that, postrevolutionary women are not interested in politics. At least that is the way it seems when we look at the lists of parliamentarians:

**In the Senate**

Political party	Number of women	Total number of senators
Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN]	2	49
Democratic Convention of Romania	1 (PNT-cd)	34
National Salvation Front	0	13
Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]	1	14
UDMR	0	12
PRM	0	6
PSM	0	5
PDAR	0	5
Total	4	143

The total number of women in the Senate represents 2.8 percent

**In the Chamber of Deputies**

Political party	Number of women	Total number of deputies
FDSN	6	117
CDR	PNT-cd; PER [Romanian Ecologist Party] 1	45
	PNL-AT [National Liberal Party-Young Wing]; PNL-CD [National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention 1	14
	PAC—0	13
	PSDR—1	10
FSN	2	43
PUNR	0	30
UDMR	0	27
PRM	1	16
PSM	0	13
Minorities	1	13
Total	13	341

The total number of women in the Chamber of Deputies represents 3.8 percent

The situation is even more disturbing at the administrative level: Only one woman (if I am not mistaken), who is secretary of state in a department for the handicapped that seems to go in and out of existence—it was recently announced that it had been abolished along with Mrs. Munteanu's job; but more recently there has been a report that this secretary of state did, participated, or said...something about the matter!)

Looking at the above data it seems that for various reasons (level of education, domestic life, poor role models promoted by Ceausescu), women are not interested in participating in political life.

But my opinion is that politics is not interested in women. They simply do not exist. They did not appear on electoral lists, or if they did, they were put somewhere near the end if not at the very end of the lists.

A research institute on women's issues (such as exists in Spain, for example) would uncover the profound and reprehensible causes of discrimination against women in Romanian society. And it is, without a doubt, a question of discrimination. On the one hand, the powers-that-be are interested in keeping women far from the world of politics and are totally successful: Countless daily anxieties force women to limit their lives to domestic concerns, from which follow such attitudes as "I do not bother with politics," "I have no time for politics," "I have children to raise," etc. It

is precisely because of this programmed torment of women that the present powers-that-be have been able to create for themselves an impressive reserve of votes. They counted, of course, on feminine psychology being based on the kind of submissiveness that has often kept Romanian women one step behind Romanian men. Thus the role of women as housekeeper, wife, and mother, has become almost incompatible with the role of women as politicians.

What is worse, when women do make it into the world of politics, they are asked to continue to act as housekeepers and as mothers, and are given tasks like those around the house: to sew (canvas for signs), to prepare who knows what kind of protocol, to make gifts for children from orphanages, to visit old people's homes—which are things that are otherwise necessary and honorable but which are very far from real political life. That is because men have become accustomed, in general, to being reluctant to accept feminine competition, and there are various ways to prevent women from participating effectively in current political contests.

The first way is by ignoring them. By a total disinterest in "looking for a woman"; I refer, of course, to well-known women who assuredly would have been more successful than some of today's parliamentarians; who would be more efficient, more decent, and more concerned with the future of the country's children.

Assuming that competent women do exist (and I know they do, particularly in the opposition parties), they have been kept, through some pretext or other, "on the bench." It has been stated out loud or in a whisper that women are not ready for parliamentary life. But who is ready? I often look at the faces of some of our parliamentarians who are rightfully astonished at being there, as if tormented by the question "Oh God, what am I doing here?" and are simply terrified at the thought of some day having to go up to the microphone... Those who have worked a long time in education are familiar with the expression on the faces of students who tremble in fear of being caught unprepared for a test. The faces of some parliamentarians look almost like that.

The fear that a woman at the top of the list of candidates would not get electoral support, that men would not have confidence in a woman, was proven completely unfounded in the case of the poet Leonida Lari, who ran successfully as a PNT-cd candidate—not in Timisoara, not in Sibiu, but in the red county of Galati.

The case of Leonida Lari is, however, unique. Unfortunately! [passage omitted]

The habit of thinking that politics is a man's job means, in fact, that men control access to the world of politics. From their point of view, women should remain sweet, lovable, and charming; they should not get upset, they should not be demanding, they should not be intransigent in a world in which the men get upset, are demanding and intransigent, and are often offensive.

At a time when women in the West have really won for themselves equal rights with men (yet still complain of some discrimination), as far as the political participation of women of Romanian is concerned, we are rank beginners.

### Decision on Controlled Item Import, Export

93BA0219A Bucharest *MONITORUL OFICIAL*  
in Romanian 9 Nov 92 pp 1-4

[Decision No 594 of the Romanian Government on Regulation of Imports and Exports of Articles and Technologies Subject to Control of Their End Destinations as Well as Regulation of Control of Exports for Purposes of Nonproliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Rockets Bearing Such Weapons]

[Text] The Romanian Government hereby decides:

#### Section I. Regulation of Imports and Exports of Items and Technologies Subject to Control of Their End Destinations

##### Article 1.

- (1) The items and technologies subject to control of their end destinations are those specified in Annex 1.
- (2) The term technology, in the sense of the present decision, means particular information, other than that in the public domain, that is necessary for developing, producing or using a product.

The information can take the form of technical data or technical aid.

##### Article 2.

Regardless of the customs system, import and export of the items and technologies subject to control of their end destinations that are specified in Annex 1 are authorized solely on the basis of a type A import license or a type B export license respectively, which are specified in Annexes 2.A and 2.B.

##### Article 3.

- (1) This regulation also applies to foreign trade operations that involve purchases or sales of items or technologies specified in Annex 1 and are performed physically outside of the area under Romanian customs jurisdiction, and also to reshipments in series, transfers, or transshipments in case the end destination is changed.
- (2) These operations can be performed solely on the basis of a type-A import license or a type-B export license.

##### Article 4.

The provisions of the present decisions apply to all items and technologies specified in Annex 1 regardless of the country of origin or manufacture and including items and technologies produced in Romania.

##### Article 5.

- (1) Items and technologies subject to control of their end destination must be accompanied by a copy of the export license issued by the exporting country.
- (2) The items and technologies are to be delivered to the importer alone, in the quantities and according to the specifications in the documents, including the export license. Any change in their destination or use must be previously authorized by the organs that issued the initial documents.

##### Article 6.

- (1) Exporters and importers of items and technologies subject to control of their end destinations are required to declare whether they conform to the provisions of

Annex 1 and to apply for a type-A import license or a type B-export license respectively.

- (2) Moreover the persons specified in Article 10 are required to state expressly in the customs declaration whether the respective goods conform to the provisions of the present decision.
- (3) If the customs duty on an import is paid to a customs house inside the area of Romanian customs jurisdiction, the importer is required to present the items and technologies subject to control at the customs house of their destination within the time limit set by the customs organ at the point of crossing the border.
- (4) If the customs duty on an export is paid to a customs house inside the area of Romanian customs jurisdiction, the exporter is required to present the documents as well as the items and technologies at the customs house at the border within the time limit set by the customs organ in the interior.

#### Article 7.

- (1) Any importer of any item or any technology specified in Annex 1 is required to provide the exporter with an import certificate and a certificate of control of delivery.
- (2) By issuing the import certificate or equivalent document the issuing authority agrees:
  - (a) To certify that the importer's declarations are true and to notify the competent organs, according to its laws, in order to penalize false declarations concerning the end use of the items and technologies subject to control;
  - (b) To oversee the use of the items and technologies subject to control according to their declared destination;
  - (c) To permit the authority in the exporter's country to make the necessary checks concerning the arrangement and progress of the transaction;
  - (d) To send the authority in the exporter's country, upon request, a certificate of control of delivery;
  - (e) To meet any other particular requirements for transfers of items and technologies subject to control, according to the international agreements.
- (3) The certificate of control of delivery confirms the arrival of the items and technologies at their destination in the quantities and according to the specifications in the documents and their use for the declared purposes.
- (4) The forms for the import certificate [CI] and the certificate of control of delivery [CCL] are specified in Annexes 3.A and 4.A respectively.

#### Article 8.

- (1) A copy of the import certificate presented by the applicant will be sent through diplomatic channels by the issuing authority to the competent authority in the exporter's country.
- (2) Type A and type B licenses will not be issued unless the import certificate and said copy are identical.

#### Article 9.

The data and information on any of the elements concerning the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3 that are provided by the importers or exporters of the items and technologies specified in Annex 1 will be certified by those authorized to undertake legal responsibility for them, and they are responsible for the truth and accuracy of the respective documents.

#### Article 10.

- (1) The provisions of the present decision apply to all persons performing the activities specified in Articles 2 and 3.
- (2) "Person" means any individual or juristic person, including government institutions, whether they are in Romania or abroad.

#### Article 11.

- (1) Type-A and type-B licenses are issued individually by the Ministry of Trade and Tourism.
- (2) The application for a license must necessarily include, in addition to the tariff entry, the number of the item and the corresponding paragraph on the lists specified in the annexes to the present decision.
- (3) Type-A and Type-B licenses are valid for six months. If it is necessary to extend their validity, the documents mentioned in the present decision must be countersigned and reconfirmed.
- (4) The licenses can be used only by the persons entered under the headings of supplier, sender, seller, exporter, and user, addressee, purchaser and importer.
- (5) The licenses cannot be transferred even in cases of merger, division or other ways of reorganizing juristic persons.
- (6) The persons specified in Article 10 are required to notify the Ministry of Trade and Tourism immediately of any changes or differences found in the documents or upon delivery and reception of the respective items and technologies. If such changes change the terms on which the respective license was issued, the declaration of those changes can be regarded as a new application for a license and the license can be revoked accordingly.

#### Article 12.

The following documents will be used for countries that have regulations similar to those in the present decision:

- (a) The CI [import certificate] is the document permitting control of the end destination. In order to obtain a CI document, the importer will fill out an application in conformity with Annex 3B.
- (b) The CCL [certificate of control of delivery] is the document permitting subsequent control of the end destination. In order to obtain a CCL document, the importer will fill out an application in conformity with Annex 4B.
- (c) If the partner countries issue documents with equivalent contents they can be used.

**Article 13.**

(1) The following rules will be observed in relations with partners in countries that have similar regulations:

(a) For exports:

—The exporter is required to ask his partner for a CI document or an equivalent issued by the competent authorities in the importing country. Said document must be attached to the application for a type-B license along with the approval of the competent authority.

—After the goods have been delivered but no later than three months from that time the exporter must obtain from his partner the CCL document or any other equivalent instrument certifying that the goods reached their destination. The exporter is required to present this document to the authorities who issued the type-B license within 120 days of the date the goods were exported.

(b) For imports:

—The importer is required to provide his partner with the CI and CCL documents, as well as a copy of the customs import declaration, upon his partner's request.

—Fulfillment of these obligations does not exempt the importer from observing the other legal provisions mentioned in the present decision.

(2) If the importer's partner requests further proof that the goods were imported in addition to the copy of the customs import declaration, the General Directorate of Customs will issue such a confirmation certifying that the goods crossed the Romanian border and entered the area of its customs jurisdiction.

**Article 14.**

(1) For countries that do not have regulations similar to those in the present decision, the following documents will be used and the following rules will be observed:

(a) For exports, issue of a type-B license will depend upon presentation of a certification by the end user, addressee, importer and purchaser whereby they promise to use the product in their country alone and for the declared purpose and to send a certificate to this effect to the supplier, sender, exporter and seller. Said certification will be in writing and signed by those authorized to assume legal responsibility for the end user, addressee, importer and purchaser and also by those competent to certify the truth and accuracy of the respective documents, and the assumed commitment must be clearly stated in the text.

(b) For imports, issue of a type-A license does not depend upon any additional document other than the import certificate.

(2) These rules apply to the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3.

**Article 15.**

(1) Control of the end destination of the items and technologies in Annex 1 requires the persons who are performing the activities specified in Articles 2 and 3 to see that the goods reach their destination and also to provide the documents specified in the present decision.

(2) The end users are also required to provide the documents specified in (1).

**Article 16.**

The addresses and telephone, fax and telex numbers of individuals or legal persons will be entered on all documents specified in the present decision alongside their names or designations.

**Article 17.**

Issue of licenses to import and export military products also requires previous approval, according to the provisions of Government Decision No. 547 of 11 December 1992 on Regulation of Imports and Exports of Special Products.

**Section II. Regulation of Control of Exports for Purposes of Nonproliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and of Rockets Bearing Such Weapons****Article 18.**

(1) The technologies, materials, substances, equipment, installations and their components subject to control are those specified in Annexes 5-8.

(2) The items and technologies specified in (1) are imported and exported according to the provisions in Section I, which apply accordingly, and also according to the particular requirements in Annexes 5-8.

**Article 19.**

Issue of import and export licenses for nuclear products also requires previous approval, according to the provisions of Law No 61 of 1974.

**Section III. National Agency for Control of Exports****Article 20.**

(1) The National Agency for Control of Exports, henceforth called "the Agency," is formed to carry out the provisions of the present decision. It is a specialized organ under the government, with juristic personality and its own budget, headed by a director general, and with the organizational structure specified in Annex 9.

(2) The Agency is coordinated by an interministerial council composed of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Tourism, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Communications and Ministry of Justice, on the level of a secretary or undersecretary of state.

(3) The Interministerial Council examines and approves import and export applications concerning the items and technologies specified in the present decision in conformity with the international obligations assumed by Romania and with its economic interests and those of national security, while also considering the activities of the end users, the credibility of the applicants, and

other considerations concerning the efficiency of the system instituted by the present decision.

Article 21.

In order to perform its functions the Agency forms its own control corps composed of the Agency's specialists and other experts as well, who are consulted when needed, while the Agency bears the expenses of exercising control.

Article 22.

The Agency has the following functions:

- (a) It checks the truth and accuracy of the declarations of the persons performing the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3.
- (b) When necessary it checks in-house or on the spot points bearing on the arrangement, progress or completion of export or import transactions that involve the items and technologies subject to control.
- (c) It cooperates with the comparable authorities in partner states in conformity with the provisions of the present decision.
- (d) It analyzes and reviews the import certificate or equivalent documents issued by the competent authorities in importing companies in order to issue type B export licenses.
- (e) It issues the import certificate and the certificate of control of delivery for imports addressed to Romanian territory.
- (f) It informs the National System of Records and Control of Nuclear Materials concerning the approvals issued.
- (g) In cooperation with the Ministry of Trade and Tourism and with the General Directorate of Customs, it periodically informs the Romanian government of trade operations to which the present decision applies.
- (h) It approves prohibiting the arrangement or stopping the progress of the operations in Articles 2 and 3 in case of violation of the provisions of the present decision.
- (i) Jointly with the competent institutions, it initiates updating the annexes to the present decision in conformity with the international commitments assumed by Romania.

Article 23.

International cooperation on the subject has the following main objectives:

- (a) Consultations and mutual information in the case of applications for a license if there are cogent indications of their possible use for purposes other than the declared ones;
- (b) Updating and uniform application of the regulations on the subject, including the lists of items and technologies subject to control;
- (c) Reporting violations of the control system for the competent organs to penalize them.

Article 24.

(1) With the support of the competent ministries, the Agency organizes an extensive program to inform the other institutions cooperating in the enforcement of the present decision, as well as the economic agents, about the objectives, principles, standards and procedures in connection with regulation of imports and exports of items and technologies subject to control of their end destinations as well as regulation of control of exports for purposes of nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of rockets bearing such weapons.

(2) The Agency and, as the case may be, the competent ministries grant specialized consultations upon requests of economic agents interested in performing the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3 and involving the items and technologies subject to control.

Section IV. Penalties and Other Provisions

Article 25.

- (1) Violations of the provisions of the present decision concerning import or export operations as well as those concerning the truthfulness of the declarations, which are offenses under the law, are penalized according to the provisions of the Penal Code.
- (2) If the acts are not considered offenses under the law, violations of the provisions of Article 6.3 and 6.4 of Article 11.2, 11.4, 11.5, and 11.6, of Article 13.1, and of Articles 15 and 16 are infractions and are penalized by a fine of 2-5 times the value of the transaction.
- (3) Infractions are determined and fines are levied by employees of the Agency and the customs organs, who are specially authorized by the heads of those institutions.
- (4) The provisions of Law No. 32 of 1968 on Establishing and Penalizing infractions are also applicable to the infractions specified in this article.

Article 26.

- (1) The General Directorate of Customs checks the truth and accuracy of the data and information entered on the documents necessary for performing the operations specified in Articles 2 and 3. Moreover the General Directorate of Customs, jointly with the other competent institutions as the case may be:
  - (a) Anticipates, determines, investigates and penalizes activities in violation of the present decision;
  - (b) Stops and inspects vehicles and goods in transit, checks grounds, buildings, property and storehouses and takes samples for identification, inspects and photocopies records and correspondence, and asks any organ or person to present documentation and information concerning trade and items and technologies subject to control;
  - (c) Overseas observance of the terms for loading, transporting, unloading, installing and storing items and technologies subject to control;
  - (d) Obtains the cooperation and help of persons engaged in selling, distributing or transporting items and

technologies subject to control, for purposes of enforcing the present decision.

- (2) Whenever necessary and in conformity with the treaties, accords or other commitments to which Romania is a party, the procedure for issuing licenses and enforcing the provisions of the present decisions can involve competent official persons in an exporting country alongside the official persons in Romania. This cooperation will include procedures for checking the previous granting of licenses and the subsequent delivery as well as general collaboration in the area of enforcing the regulations concerning control of exports.
- (3) In the case of exports, persons who act as sellers are required to enter their right of control, direct or through the Agency, over the end destination of the goods as part of the concluded contracts.

#### Article 27.

- (1) For the export or import operations specified in Articles 2 and 3 that are in progress on the date the present decision takes effect and involve items and technologies subject to control, the license or reconfirmation of the license will be requested in conformity with the provisions of the present decision within no more than 30 days from the date the present decision takes effect.
- (2) If the request is not made within that time, the previously issued license is legally void and the operations in progress are suspended until another license is obtained.
- (3) If the license is not reconfirmed or a license is not obtained within 45 days from the date the present decision takes effect as the case may be, the operations in progress are suspended until a license is obtained.

#### Article 28.

- (1) Annexes 1-9<sup>1</sup> are integral parts of the present decision.
- (2) The present decision takes effect 15 days from the date it is published in MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI.
- (3) Any provision to the contrary is hereby abrogated.

Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan.

Countersigned by Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase, Minister of Trade and Tourism Constantin Fota, Minister of National Defense Major General Nicolae Spiroiu, Minister of Economy and Finance George Danilescu, Minister of Industry Dan Constantinescu, Minister of Environment Marcian Bleahu, Minister of Interior Victor Babiuc, Minister of Communications Andrei Chirica and Minister of Justice Mircea Ionescu-Quintus

Bucharest 28 September 1992

No. 594

<sup>1</sup>Annexes 1-9 are published in a pamphlet available from the Ministry of Trade and Tourism.

#### Health Minister on Subsidies, Privatization

93P20080A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian  
13 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Val Vilcu: "The Minister of Health Says That the Demographic Crisis Is a Result of the Standard of Living"]

[Text] The press conference of Minister of Health Iulian Mincu confirmed the fact that the health sector, one of the great invalids of the country, is beginning to feel better. An important success in this area is the issuance of a government decision on the basis of which 200 medicines (out of 530 approved for human use) will be 50 to 100 percent subsidized. The principal beneficiaries are disadvantaged persons: retirees, unemployed, and children. The funds (about 20 billion lei a year) will be obtained by taxing tobacco and alcohol advertising and marketing. The decision will go into effect in a few days.

The structure of the ministry was finalized. It has three new general directorates: one for the National Health Insurance Fund (with prospects for becoming a new ministry), another for programs and reform, and a third, which is absolutely indispensable. This is the Directorate for the Accreditation of Health Personnel and Units, which has an important role in initiating privatization and in accrediting medical training institutions, both state and private. The principal problem that the new directorates face is lack of personnel; fifty positions will be filled on a competitive basis.

Pharmacies will be completely privatized and the rest of the units will be privatized in correlation with the establishment of insurance funds. The Health Police Inspectorate has been re-established, having monitoring functions that range from ensuring observance of regulations on medicines (the only item that is totally controlled by the state) to ensuring the purity of drinking water.

Subsidizing powdered milk for infants will give private agents the incentive to import this product. The main obstacle to the production of medicines (which decreased from 5 billion lei in 1989 to 3 billion lei in 1992, despite inflation) was the 20 percent tax levied on the import of pharmaceutical substances. The ministry will ask for the repeal of this tax and for the prohibition of cigarette advertising. The monetary losses will be lower than the cost of treating those who become ill due to smoking. The minister gave his assurance that any attempt to prohibit abortion would be opposed since the demographic crisis is a result of the decrease in the standard of living.

In regard to the subsidies, let us mention that funds will be paid to private pharmacies every 10 days and the control organs will try to prevent abuses and the transfer of medicines outside the country. We will provide details on how to obtain subsidized prescriptions.

**Jan Carnogursky on Ideology, Goals of KDH**  
93CH0237A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK  
in Slovak 28 Nov 92 p 10

[Article by Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement: "Defending the KDH"]

[Text] The article by Imrich Kružliak in LITERARNY TYZDENNIK 43/92 ("Problems of Christian Politics") is actually a flattering compliment to the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement]. Imrich Kružliak writes about the problems of Christian politics in Slovakia and writes only about KDH. Yes, Christian politics in Slovakia is the KDH and the KDH is Christian politics in Slovakia. To some extent the problems of the KDH mirror the problems of Christians in postcommunist Slovakia.

Following the November retreat of communism, the KDH came into being with an extraordinary internal dynamism. In response to an appeal Christian democratic clubs were organized in towns and villages and the KDH was the only party that arose from below. We grew rapidly in public opinion polls, soon outdistanced the VPN [Public Against Violence], which was then the leading force, and were generally expected to win an election victory which we ultimately failed to achieve. For its rapid initial rise, the KDH is indebted to a combination of two ideological and political sources. One of them I will call the legacy of the HSLS [Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party]; the other is the example of modern Western European Christian democracies.

Few among us realized at the time that these two sources cannot coexist for long within a single political movement. I understand the HSLS legacy as the legacy of its entire period of existence, not just its conclusion. This content encompassed proposals for the KDH to include in its program Slovakia's independence or at least a confederation, closer ties to the church hierarchy and emphasis on the cultural and social picture of Slovakia through the first half of this century. This idea of KDH policy was a mechanical followup to Slovak Christian politics of, say, 1946 in which Imrich Kružliak too played a significant and constructive part. Supporting this political line was the fact that already prior to November 1989 our activists kept alive and promoted the Slovak national idea in samizdat publications, at fairs and elsewhere, cooperated closely with the church hierarchy and already then with the still secret Bishop Korec as well as others. This concept may well have drawn strength also from my own family background.

The line relating to contemporary Christian democratic parties in the West drew strength primarily from the electoral successes they won in their countries, from contacts we began to establish with them right from the outset, our explicit orientation toward these parties and their programs, and acceptance of the modern Christian democratic political line by our population as well. The political line of contemporary Western Christian democracy emphasized the national foundation of politics but rejected separatism; it was anchored in religion but maintained the autonomous position of a political party vis-a-vis the church, and while wishing to exert influence on cultural, social, and economic policies of the entire nation it realizes that it cannot exert this influence by acts of administrative power.

Within the KDH, the contest of these two concepts lasted until the departure of the SKDH [Slovak Christian Democratic Movement] (Editor's note: at present the KSU [Christian Social Union]) in March of this year. After the SKDH left the line oriented toward European Christian democracies gained significantly in strength within the KDH. The election results have shown that even though weakened, this line in Slovak Christian politics predominates, is the strongest.

Imrich Kružliak reproaches the KDH for being much too Christian and not enough national. Well, history teaches that two principles can unite people most strongly: religion and nation. The ideal situation is when both are in harmony. The KDH is trying to bring them into harmony and seeks to find a proper relation between them. Slovakia is Christian and it is altogether natural that there are Christians in the KDH who practice, more or less, their Christian faith. All have their place in the KDH, and the KDH makes it possible for them to express their views politically. Ultimately, political reality will anyway slough off the extremes and enable the political center to prevail. But democracy in Slovakia requires that even radical Christians are given an opportunity to be heard. We press for church schools where enough children apply to fill at least one school. Incidentally, experience thus far suggests that church schools as a rule rank above the level of public [state] schools in town. We press for the return of properties to churches because it is just and corresponds to the logic of returning property to its original owners. The number of abortions in proportion to the population is in Slovakia among the highest in the world. Even in such a liberal country as the United States they now find that the high abortion rate is an acute social problem and are looking for a solution. The KDH is trying to see the number of abortions reduced and it is only a matter of time for this to be understood by other political parties as well. But the issue is not only proposing legislation and policies to be implemented by the government. Our professional associations, our activists as also our clubs in Slovakia are expanding the Christian infrastructure on all levels, outside the framework of the churches themselves. No other party or organization has so far managed to generate such activities. Yes, it is a problem for the KDH to move beyond the community of only moderately active Christians and address the broader strata of society. We are hard at work to achieve this. That we are presently in opposition offers us a chance. Members of the intelligentsia inclining toward liberalism have an opportunity to recognize that it is not enough just to have ideas which may appear logical, but that one must also have social strength, simply a multitude of people capable of translating ideas into policy. The most dependable multitude of people in Slovakia are the Christians. Then too, the logic of ideas differs, whether they stem from momentary criteria or from the criteria of a longer historical perspective. In its time the communist model of organizing society appeared logical, and where is it now? And the same fate befell many other seemingly logical projects. Prior to the 1990 elections, some VPN activists were spreading the story that the KDH supposedly lacks personalities and therefore cannot lead Slovakia. Well now, where are the VPN personalities of that time, where is the VPN itself? Indeed, the one who then asserted it most vigorously was Vladimír Mečiar, though his current government is hardly a parade of personalities.

Christianity gives Slovakia a universal dimension, and without it Slovakia remains only a small country without a clear direction.

In the universality of Christendom, nations arise. The Slovak nation is one of them and belongs rather among the smaller ones. Of course the Slovak nation has a right to self-determination. Solution to the Slovak question is quite complicated and requires a sensitive approach. Let me illustrate this assertion by showing the short duration of times when Slovakia was in the ascendant. If we trace them back to the past, the upsurge of 1968 lasted from January 1968 to April 1969, when Alexander Dubcek was removed from the office of the CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] Central Committee general secretary—that is, not quite one and a half years. Prior to that an upsurge may be seen in the period between the election victory in May 1946 and the arrest of Kempny and Bugar and revelation of the so-called Slovak conspiracy in September 1947, or again barely one and a half years. The 1944 uprising lasted two months, after which it was only fighting in retreat. If for formal reasons we include also the Slovak Republic of 1939-45, it lasted six years. The Matica period in 1863-67 lasted four years, Stur's uprising, say, two years. In between these periods are always decades of national duress, in no way relieved by feverish activities of individuals.

The KDH seeks a promising and permanent solution to the Slovak question, not a short-lived upsurge. A promising and permanent solution to the Slovak question lies solely within the European context.

A solution within the European context was also the concept of "a little star and a little chair," however much I. Kružliak may snicker at it.

Slovakia faces two different roads. One is the road of an authoritarian Slovakia. A Slovakia that lacks sufficient confidence in itself and therefore relies solely on a narrow circle of those who are convinced and determined, or at least shouting loudly. This kind of Slovakia absolutizes the nation and excludes from it everyone who applies to its actions criteria other than those of narrow nationalism. This Slovakia always needs an enemy, domestic as well as foreign, in order to keep its faithful on guard and justify the casting aside of all others. In its propaganda it conceals the diverse aspects of each solution and bombastically proclaims only the positive aspects of a single solution. It is a Slovakia which trusts no one, and the ingrained distrust will split up even its faithful. It is a Slovakia of a totalitarian style in politics and Byzantine style in propaganda.

The other road is the road of a many-sided Slovakia. A many-sided Slovakia does not pursue solutions that are not approved by the majority, as for instance independence, but allows the solutions to ripen organically to their best possible form. Because it does not force anything on the people it can trust them. It believes in the strength of the national idea and therefore is certain that the nation will ultimately prevail. It can remain democratic, able to give a hearing to opponents but while voting against them does not resort to administrative restrictions. The solutions it finds are permanent because they rest on the strength of the majority and peaceful organic progress.

The KDH stands for the second road. It voted against the declaration of Slovak sovereignty, as well as against the

proposal of a Slovak Republic Constitution, because both pulled Slovakia toward the false road mentioned earlier. The HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] bombastically proclaimed Slovakia's sovereignty, but, when it came to the first serious problem faced by Slovakia—Gabcikovo—it evaded responsibility and sought to shift the problem to the federal government. The HZDS declared Slovakia's sovereignty, but, when the issue was the principal attribute of sovereignty—the armed forces—it opposed the division of the present army because it was aware that Slovakia lacks the economic base for building up a technically well-equipped army within a short period of time.

Under past governments Slovakia was visited by top leaders of European states; sovereign Slovakia has so far been visited by no one. For now only one foreign political leader, the prime minister of Hungary at which Vladimir Meciar aims a good deal of strong language, has invited the prime minister of Slovakia to a visit. No other government leader has offered an invitation to Vladimir Meciar. The KDH has questioned aspects of the economic reform but since it was unable to formulate its own different solution, even a partial one, we did not halt economic reform. The HZDS criticized the so-called Klaus reform but so far has been unable to formulate a different concept of reform. Yet it has brought reform to a stop. Since the new government took office up to the time of this writing, privatization has not moved forward. The stalled economic reform will lead to social unrest. This is what Meciar fears and for which he blames his opponents, by coincidence primarily the SDL [Party of Democratic Left]. Such policy will have the main effect of putting pressure on the HZDS, which is responsible for it.

In April 1991, the newly founded HZDS split up the VPN. This was the principal reason for recalling Vladimir Meciar from the office of prime minister. Had he remained in that post he would have taken the same course of action he is taking now, only earlier. Let everyone answer the question whether that would have been to Slovakia's advantage. For the KDH, it was out of the question to join the HZDS at that time; in any case, even then a new government would not have had a majority in the Slovak National Council. Vladimir Meciar simply found himself with a minority in the parliament and therefore was recalled. I do not know what is inhuman about that.

This is a time of deciding where the countries of Central Europe will fit geopolitically. The decision is also about Slovakia's place in the future. The KDH is best able to bring Slovakia into the European Community and at the same time maintain ties to the East as well as to the South. The KDH is the carrier of Slovakia's favorable image abroad. Because of the policies it has been following.

—Bratislava, 16 November 1992

#### Ethnic Hungarian Parties Denounce Extremism 93CH0310B Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian 23 Dec 92 p 1

[Statement issued by the representatives in the Slovak parliament of the Coexistence Political Movement and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement in Bratislava on 21 December 1992: "Joint Statement"]

[Text] A growing number of phenomena in our society clearly impede the evolution of democracy. The indifference

manifested by public safety officials and by representatives of the highest state administrative bodies regarding this situation does not strengthen our confidence in the evolution of a constitutional state.

We feel compelled to express concern regarding the lawlessness manifested by "skinheads," creating fear among the populace in recent weeks. They encourage the hatred of aliens, while regarding themselves as nationalistically oriented youth fighting for the purity of the nation. Their actions are aimed at the Jewish, Roma, and Hungarian minorities in Slovakia. This is proven by their watchwords: *Jude 'raus* [out with the Jews] and *Madari za Dunaj* [Hungarians, over to the other side of the Danube]. They also demand an investigation of statements made by, and the activities of, leaders of Hungarian movements. We object to having such an extreme group assess our activities and demand that a decision be rendered over our fate.

We do not feel reassured by the report of official law and order organs, according to which the demonstration organized by these youths was peaceful and, for the time being, no force whatsoever had to be applied?! But how should we view the desecration of the Ersekujvar [Nove Zamky] Jewish cemetery on 30 October 1992 (the results of the investigations are not yet known), the Tardoskedd [Tvrdosovce] pogrom in late November, in the course of which 18 "skinheads" from Pozsony [Bratislava] set fires and beat people (Gypsies and non-Gypsies), or their latest lawlessness at the Malomvolgy university college at Pozsony, in which students holding foreign citizenship were the victims? Despite the fact that on 18 December no violence was manifested in Pozsony, their actions, force, and watchwords aimed at aliens and citizens of other than the Slovak nationality carry the seeds of fascism.

Where are the policemen and what is their duty? Why does the government tolerate youths wearing masks in front of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, inciting people against aliens, Jews, and Hungarians, and propagating the hatred of aliens? Does their indifference contribute to creating the real image of Slovakia? We call the attention of the chief prosecutor of Slovakia to this threat and process, and call on him to initiate an investigation regarding the defamation of nationalities and the propagation of racial hatred. We caution the government and the state organs having jurisdiction, that unless they quell extreme manifestation in time, at the beginning, they are not going to be able to harness these later. We suggest that the Committee on State Administration, Local Government, and Nationalities of the National Council of the Slovak Republic consider this problem.

In its desire to follow the democratic path toward a united Europe, our society must firmly reject and prevent every endeavor that threatens fundamental human and civil rights.

*Pozsony [Bratislava], 21 December 1992*

*The Coexistence Political Movements and the parliamentary faction of the MKDM [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement]*

**Slovak TV 'Agitating' Against Hungarian Schools**  
93CH03104 Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian  
16 Dec 92 pp 1-2

[Statement made by Erzsebet Dolnik, executive secretary of the Coexistence Movement, on 15 December 1992: "Education-Withering Report on Slovak TV: 'Why Do You Go to a Hungarian School?'"]

[Text] *At an international news conference held on Monday, sponsored jointly by the Coexistence Movement and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Representative Pal Csaky gave proof to journalists of the frontal attack on native language use by the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. On the same day he appeared on the television program "Current Events (Actuality)."*

After conversing with Csaky, they showed a film recorded by the Slovak TV staff at various schools teaching in the Hungarian language. Erzsebet Dolnik, the lead secretary of the Coexistence Movement, called our editorial office yesterday and had this to say about the broadcast:

"Children were also made to speak in this report; specifically, at the Pelsoc [Plesivec] Hungarian Language Elementary School, the reporter inquired from one of the pupils why he was enrolled in the Hungarian school. The child replied in the Slovak language: 'Because my nationality is Hungarian, and because I am more proficient in Hungarian than in Slovak.' When asked whether he would be disadvantaged as a result of going to a Hungarian school, and whether it would be better for him to go to a Slovak school, the child could not answer, he only smiled. This segment of the report was repeated several times. This was followed by commentary stating that parents do not always consider whether it is to the benefit of their children to enroll them in Hungarian schools, and that actually the biggest problem parents have is the lack of choice, because only Hungarian language schools exist in many villages inhabited by Hungarians. For this reason a proposal advanced by Education Minister Kucera should be welcomed: He suggests that parents in villages inhabited by Hungarians, and having only a Hungarian language school, be given a choice by establishing schools in which classical courses are taught in the native language, while the rest of the courses in the Slovak language. Thus, the chances of children would improve; they could be more successful in life. Based on Mr. Kucera's plan, only two possibilities would exist: Hungarian schools would either be discontinued in favor of 'alternative schools providing greater career potentials,' or the already low enrollment in Hungarian schools would decline even further, so that these schools would automatically cease to exist. Not to mention the fact that under the minister's plan the alternative schools would receive more funding, to the detriment of schools in which the language of teaching is Hungarian.

"As part of the report they also asked an official of the education office about the preparedness of educators in Hungarian language schools. He replied by saying that there were many untrained teachers. They forgot to state, of course, the background to this phenomenon, i.e., that Hungarian teacher training has been purposely made to wither for decades and that there is no indication of resolving this

*problem. The film report created an impression in the viewers as if the number of Hungarian schools was too large, even though they did not compare the figure they gave for Hungarian schools with the number of people who used the Hungarian language, and failed to mention the number of settlements inhabited by Hungarians which did not have Hungarian schools, and in which children were forced to attend Slovak schools.*

"I find that tenor of the biased program, its distortions, and its failure to state certain facts are outrageous, and

regard the agitating of the public against Hungarian schools as its unquestionable intent. It does so when it claims that these schools do not provide to children opportunities to succeed. By attacking Hungarian schools, this report tries to provide an ideological charge to a proposed action by the ministry, one that is unprecedented even in the framework of the previous system. And what is most outrageous: The report used the statements of minors to support biased statements made as part of the program."

**Interior Minister on Threat to Macedonia**

93BA0428X Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 24 Dec 92 p 4

[Article by B.J.: "The Greatest Risk—The External Factor"]

[Text] *Report from Ljubomir Frckovski to those fighting for a politically secure condition in the country.*

*According to all predictions, violations of the internal stability of the Republic are possible first of all from the north. If conflict arises in Kosovo, our option is to close the borders to this move.*

The political security condition in the Republic during this very anxious time may be considered to be relatively satisfactory. This conclusion was put forward in yesterday's report of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ljubomir Frckovski, to the members of the Republic Council of the Union of the Association of Fighters of the NOB [People's Liberation Struggle] of Macedonia at the fourth annual meeting of this body.

Frckovski insisted that a great contribution to the stability of the Republic, which is a result of the relation of the political forces in our country, is made by the service which is concerned with the safety of the state, and which is being consolidated and which is still evolving without breaks and purges and where now 85 percent are young people distributed in all 13 departments. They are true professionals and are not ideologically fabricated. Although there is an increase in some types of criminals and in robberies, it is expected that they will be successfully reduced with increased work activity of all in the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. At one time, Frckovski said, upon the withdrawal of the troops of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] the police successfully took over the borders which now the Macedonian Army holds and which functions on all borders except with Serbia, where the border is not precisely marked. On the border with Albania, up to now 400 illegal crossings have been observed, and there were incidents since the Albanian Army not only did not stop them, but also helped these crossings, which were, first of all, of an economic nature. However, now with the three new border crossings and the agreement concerning border collaboration reached with this country, it is expected that matters will be handled properly.

Minister Frckovski informed those present that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] forces, around 20 policemen without weapons, who will only perform inspection according to very precise orders, will be placed just on the Albanian border, more precisely, in the Depar section. The first contingent from the Nordic countries, from Sweden, Finland, and Norway, is expected to arrive at the beginning of next week.

According to Minister Frckovski's report, the greatest risk to internal political stability comes from the external factor involving certain traditional historical options directed toward those territories, and therefore our relations with our neighbors, and in particular with Serbia, must be built very attentively. With Bulgaria there are no open questions concerning the borders between the two countries, with Greece things have to be considered in the context of its alliance with Serbia, while greater problems are not to be expected from the western border. However, they may be

expected if conflicts break out in Kosovo, first of all because of the explicit declaration of Albania that it will defend its interests. In this case our option is to close the borders with Kosovo since we cannot help anyone in this quarrel, and we will not allow ourselves to become involved in a foreign conflict. There is a risk of conflict with the Albanian population on our territory in this border section of the Republic, because of which the UNPROFOR forces have been called up for this corridor. However, we will not bear the responsibility for this. Frckovski emphasized that we have presented all this to the international community as well as the fact that in this case there will be a flood of refugees from there, for the sake of which three refugee camps are being prepared. However, then we would send them out of Macedonia, which has already been discussed. In this worst version of conflicts in the north, we would concentrate all of our forces on the western border.

The reports concerning the visit to Macedonia, and conversations of the delegations from the international military organizations in the Republic were accepted at this meeting of the Republic Council of SZBNOV [Federation of Veterans of the People's Liberation War], as well as reports concerning the conversations with the Bulgarian Antifascist Union and with the Organization of Fighters from Albania. Then a decision to seek membership of SZBNOV of Macedonia in the World Federation of Military Veterans, the office of which is in Paris, was passed.

**Question Session at Macedonian Assembly**

93BA0428C Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 25 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by the NOVA MAKEDONIJA Investigation Team: "A Session of Parliamentary Questions and Answers"]

[Text] *How will the operation of the black market in the Old Marketplace be stopped, does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MVR] have a strategy for blocking the aggressive Greek propaganda, what people now are having their phones tapped by the Fifth Department of the MVR, why have the Macedonian border guards been withdrawn from the border corridor between Macedonia and Serbia?*

The 53d Parliamentary Session began with a delay of two hours, and the reason was the work of two committees and then the absence of the government for whose members the deputies waited in the hall for 40 minutes. The session actually began with the deputies' opposing questions. The deputies who were dissatisfied with the answers of the government took their turns at the rostrum and exercised the right of additional questioning and then proceeded to pose new questions. This part of the session lasted some two and one-half hours, the 37 deputies who appeared, some several times, posed around 130 questions to the government. Some of the questions were answered at the same session, while the answers to the other ones will be made in written form. We will choose the more interesting ones.

The question posed by *Mikail Panovski*, Ilinden Free Democrat, if the Republic, that is the minister of foreign affairs, has submitted a request for admission to the United Nations, in the absence of Denko Maleski, was answered by Prime Minister *Branko Crvenkovski*, who confirmed that this request already had been submitted.

*Ismet Ramadani* of the PDP [Party of Democratic Prosperity] asked if the government can find a method and way, without using force, to prevent the operation of the black market in the Old Marketplace. A partial answer was given by the Minister of Internal Affairs, *Ljubomir Frckovski*, who said that incidents in which force is used are minimal and the police seek ways to avoid them. Likewise, he insisted that the tensions in Bit Pazar are increasing, since individuals who are not our citizens, who falsely declare repression among the political parties seeking protection, are appearing. This is a matter of misuse for private purposes and in these cases it is easy for an incident to occur.

Otherwise, *Frckovski* mentioned that the MVR had received petitions from Albanian craftsmen who are complaining that the participation of their leaders reduces business. As he emphasized, the entire problem is that up to now there have been no legal or other possibilities for legalizing the black market by opening private exchanges.

#### Laws for the Currency Exchange Are Prepared

The Minister of Finance, *Dzevdet Hajredini*, was included in answering the question posed, reporting that they are in the course of preparing draft laws connected with the currency exchange, for which experience from the countries where they are already used is being assembled, and these laws will soon be submitted to the assembly.

*Dragi Arsov* of VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] asked when the Assembly will conduct a detailed discussion of foreign policy, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a strategy for countering aggressive Greek propaganda, actually a propaganda war by Greece, how many requests for Macedonian citizenship have been approved since the law for citizenship and the structure of the petitioners went into effect, and when the Assembly will consider essential laws in the area of the economy.

Prime Minister *Branko Crvenkovski*, who said that the Assembly had debated foreign policy at several meetings, most recently before the Edinburgh Summit, answered the question posed in the name of *Denko Maleski*. With respect to the strategy for countering Greek propaganda, *Crvenkovski* answered that this is a matter for the executive authority, confirming that the Greek side carries out intense propaganda activity, but, unfortunately, he said that they have not succeeded in reaching their goal. Concerning the laws in the area of the economy he answered that the government had delivered 140 laws, in fact not all of a systemic nature. Then he mentioned that, for example, the Law for the Transformation of Capital has been going around the Assembly for a year, and that they are prepared to submit a draft law, and they would be thankful to the Assembly if it hurried up the procedure.

#### Who Sought Foreign Military Intervention

*Mitko Anastasovski* of VMRO-DPMNE asked when a law for distinguishing citizens of our country will be passed, and *Stoile Stojkov* of the same party asked if the government has secret regulations which are published in a special official journal and if there are what is the constitutional basis for that. *Vladimir Golubovski* of VMRO-DPMNE asked if the MVR has proof that a certain Macedonian political party requested foreign military intervention, the independent

deputy *Todor Petrov* asked what people have their phones tapped now by the well-known 5th Department of the MVR with a request for publication of the list, and what is the status of the Greek Consulate in the Republic. *Avdi Murtezani* of PDP was interested in how many beginning employees, that is, people, were accepted for work in the Ministry of Internal Affairs when this ministry declared a competition, and what is the nationality structure of those accepted, and then how many requests were submitted to the district units for bearing fire arms. *Boris Zmejkovski* of VMRO-DPMNE asked why 20 days ago the border guards of the ARM [Army of the Republic of Macedonia] were removed at the border corridor between Macedonia and Serbia at the Kumanovo border, and 70 kilometers of territory was left without any monitoring at the time when the forces from UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] had to come.

*Djulistana Markovska* sought an answer from the government as to when the MVR would replace the blank forms for obtaining citizenship, according to which it at least confirms that Yugoslav citizenship was given. *Natje Stojanovski* of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] asked which of the delegates in the parliament during the period from 8 January 1991 to today have misused their status and exercised influence to obtain employment for their relatives once and twice removed, that is, friends in the agencies and institutions of the Republic which are financed by the budget. *Nikola Krstevski* of VMRO-DPMNE asked why the new government does not act, that is does not propose deputy ministers, and *Mikail Panovski* posed a question to the SDSM, RS-LP [Reformist Party-Liberal Party], and SPM [Socialist Party of Macedonia] inquiring about the truth of the money which these parties obtained during the time of multiparty government, during the past three years, from the public companies and from budget organizations. *Djordji Bojkovski* of the SDSM added to this, asking that everything should be brought to the light of day concerning all political parties registered in Macedonia, and not only three.

#### Discussion About the Public Information Media

At the very beginning of the approval of the agenda for the 53d Session of the parliament, the independent deputy, *Todor Petrov*, answered a protest because he said that there was a break in the Register, with respect to the report of the information service of the Assembly published for the 52d Session, in which the president of the Republic reported on the activities concerning international recognition of Macedonia. *Petrov* thought that this was a calculated and intentionally placed news item in order to deceive the domestic and international public concerning the agreement recently made in the name of the Republic. The President of the Assembly, *Stojan Andov*, called his words political marketing and a misuse of the rostrum, since he was discussing a theme which was not on the agenda and it was clear that he himself thought that such a report at this moment was useful since the foreign agencies already had made known that the Assembly had voted and adopted changes in the name. *Andov* emphasized that this did not cause any harm to the Register.

Then the deputies respected the request of the government to examine the decision concerning preliminary financing of the functions of the government in 1993 at this session and it was agreed to introduce information concerning the conditions in agriculture as a new point. Concerning the request of *Ismet Ramadani* and his parliamentary group—it was decided to

put information concerning the events at Bit Pazar of 6 November on the agenda for the next session, while *Mikail Panovski*, Ilinden Free Democrats, activated the request for discussing the public information media. After several presentations at the rostrum, his and those of *Djuristana Markovska* and *Ljupcho Jakimovski*, who had requested this discussion earlier, the delegates were told that information concerning the organizational setup of the public information media in Macedonia and the conditions in Macedonian television are to be introduced as a last point of the agenda on this 53d Session, which is expected to have several continuations. Prime Minister *Branko Crvenkovski* accepted that the government would prepare material in which the organizational structure of the information media would be presented, and the annual report and other material forwarded from Macedonian television would be used in the discussion of the conditions in Macedonian television.

The agenda was supplemented with the reports concerning the events in Kukliš, Radovish, Skopje, and Debar.

#### **Macedonian State Security Controversy Detailed**

##### **Parties Denounce Police**

*93BA0428A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 23 Dec 92 p 4*

[Article by Z. Petrov: "Party Denunciations Against the Police"]

[Text] According to the report of the Assembly Commission for Monitoring the Work of the State Security Service (SDB).

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVR], conclusions of the reduced Commission for Monitoring the Work of the State Security Service are tendentious and contrary to the actual conditions.

Once again the police are at the center of attention. The quarrel with the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], which has lasted for several months, amply begun with several known "affairs," is going through its epilogue in the Assembly of the Republic, that is, in one of its working bodies—the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the State Security Service. Yesterday the decision was announced in the form of a report in which it is mentioned that the commission has acted in three cases in the course of the last five months: distribution of fliers in the Bulgarian language in the election campaign for the first multiparty elections in November 1990, concerning doubts about the formation of paramilitary units in the "Blue Bird" restaurant in the vicinity of Kocani on 16 April of this year, and the doubts about the tapping of the official telephone of VMRO-DPMNE.

In connection with the first case and on the basis of the documents offered, the report states that the commission confirmed that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its leader did not act according to the legal regulations since it was confirmed who was the perpetrator of this. According to the statement of the commission, the participation of an official of the State Security Service and of a member of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia [ARM] in forming a paramilitary unit goes beyond the official authorizations of the representative of the MVR, since he participated in forming paramilitary units and incorporating them into the security structures

of the Republic. With respect to the third case, tapping the official telephone of the VMRO-DPMNE, the commission confirmed and concluded that this is contrary to the constitution of Macedonia, but they did not say if in truth the telephone was tapped, which surely would be a serious accusation against the police. The report says that the commission for Monitoring the Work of the SDB submitted the report to the president of the Assembly and that most probably it will be examined at some future session of the parliament.

#### **Chronology of the Confrontations**

Officially, everything began on 6 July with the news conference of VMRO-DPMNE, when a video cassette that showed the founding meeting of the Macedonian National Guard held on 16 April in the "Blue Bird" restaurant at Kocani was played before journalists. Among others, the following men were present at the meeting: Dobri Velickovski, head of the Second Office of State Security, and Dragan Stojmanovski, an officer of the ARM, which for the members of VMRO-DPMNE is proof that certain police structures intend to compromise the party in any possible way, since almost all those present at the founding meeting of the Macedonian National Guard (MNG) were members of the VMRO-DPMNE. At that news conference the journalists were handed a report seeking the resignation of President Gligorov and of Minister Frckovski, as well as seeking that the public prosecutor bring action against the representatives of the MVR and the ARM.

The next important moment in the skirmishes between the MVR and the VMRO-DPMNE was the television duel between Ljupco Georgievski and Dobri Velickovski, held only four days later, within the framework of the "Without a Title, But With a Cause" television program. In the discussion and the different explanations concerning the presence of Velickovski at this meeting, Georgievski at one point produced official documents of the SDB from which, apparently, it appears that the party telephone of VMRO-DPMNE is tapped.

And, finally, on 29 July in the editorial offices of the REPUBLIKA journal, Aleksandar Dinevski-Marks, the suspended assistant head of the Fourth Department of the State Security Service, held a news conference. On this occasion Dinevski made a number of accusations against the MVR, which according to him is involved in serious political affairs, pointing to the documents concerning the tapping of the telephone of VMRO-DPMNE, which he claimed to be the originals. For this reason, Dinevski distributed to the representatives of the news media a public petition to Minister Frckovski concerning the illegal suspension from work which was carried out and the unconstitutional and illegal behavior in carrying out the function of minister of internal affairs. On the very next day the commission for Monitoring the Work of the SDB held an emergency meeting at which only the members of the VMRO-DPMNE participated (Stoyko Stojkov, Mitko Anastasovski, and Aleksandar Florovski). On this occasion they read the request to the MVR that it allow the commission access to the official materials of the SDB—concerning monitoring certain telephone numbers.

With respect to the so-called case of the distribution of fliers in the Bulgarian language during the elections in 1990, this has been discussed several times at the Assembly sessions.

Namely, representatives of VMRO-DPMNE several times have declared that they have at their disposal proof that the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia [SDSM] and its members and now the current Vice President of the Assembly, Tito Petkovski, are behind all of this.

#### **"This Is a Party Commission!"**

With respect to the frequent accusations of VMRO-DPMNE, the Ministry of Internal Affairs regularly has issued public reports in which it has denounced party statements. In connection with the "Dinevski" case, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ljubomir Frckovski, stated to our journal on 1 August that it is a matter of a common example of what loyalty to the police is as opposed to the influence and interest of the political parties. According to him, the case of the suspended official of the SDB, who evidently had a connection with VMRO-DPMNE, shows that this party had its own positions in the police through Dinevski.

On the other hand, with respect to its report of the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the SDB, yesterday we obtained the declaration from the head of this service, who also is the under secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Slobodan Bogoevski*. According to him the report is a result of the work of a party commission, which has been working for several months ignoring and suspending the facts and knowledge of the MVR, and with that the Register of the work of the Assembly of Macedonia. As Bogoevski says, the committee quorum is misused in a tendentious way, since of the seven members, three are representatives of the VMRO-DPMNE deputy group, and one is from the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], so that conclusions that are contrary to the actual situation are reached. On several visits, Bogoevski says, our knowledge of the three cases was presented to the commission, but they most probably have decided to push through the matter in their own way. The under secretary of MVR likewise declared that, most probably today, the Ministry of Internal Affairs will supply expanded information to the responsible bodies and to the information media, which will present extensive material concerning the accusations that the MVR and SDB have overstepped their official authorizations.

#### **MVR Response**

*93BA0428B Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 24 Dec 92 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "The Conclusions of the Commission Are Unfounded and Tendentious"]

[Text] Reaction of the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to the report of the Commission for Monitoring the SDB [State Security Service].

*"Blue Bird": The accusations that it is a matter of terrorists organized by the ARM [Army of the Republic of Macedonia] and MVR are part of the political marketing of VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity];*

*"A Den": On the basis of the information of the SDB that individual Macedonian citizens have been in contact with other intelligence services discussing organization of terrorist activities, a decision was made to carry out counteroperations.*

Since the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the SDB did not take account of the confirmed facts and evidence of

the work of the SDB in putting together its report and drawing its conclusions, the Ministry of Internal Affairs yesterday issued the following information concerning the behavior of the SDB in the cases that were the subject of the discussion of the commission.

#### **Concerning the Bulgarian Fliers**

In the course of 24 and 25 November 1990, immediately before the second round of voting in the first multiparty elections in the Republic, a fairly large number of fliers (over a thousand were found) in the Bulgarian language with the heading "The Sacred Simplicity Utilized" were distributed in several places in Skopje.

In connection with this the State Security Service undertook measures and activities to solve the case and to find the distributors of the leaflets.

Although the case of the fliers was solved relatively quickly, according to the evaluation of the former Secretary of the Republic *Jovan Trpenovski* and the Under Secretary of the State Security Service *Stevan Pavleski*, an order was issued to eliminate the bulk of the operational and criminal documents connected with this with the explanation that it is not a matter in the sphere of operation of the SDB. They preserved only a part of the operational documents on the basis of which information was prepared by the service and delivered to (now deceased) Minister *Jordan Mijalkov* as a response to a deputy's questioned concerning the fliers. There is no evidence in the information that would indicate that Mr. *Mijalkov* supplied it to the government or not. This was found in the commission report concerning the contents of the official material found in Mr. *Mijalkov*'s safe after his death.

At the request of the commission, the information was delivered immediately at the time appointed by the commission.

The report and the conclusion of the commission did not specify the period at issue, although it was known, and with respect to office holders in the former Republic Secretariat, according to Article 20 of the Law for Internal Affairs, the minister answers to the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia and the government concerning the work of the State Security Service. The responsibility is specific and connected with the performance of the function. It is contrary to the law for the present minister to seek responsibility for a period when another performed the function and for undertaking and not undertaking actions during this period.

However, in connection with this, the Ministry of Internal Affairs considers that the authorized workers of the former Republic Secretariat were obliged to undertake the necessary measures in accordance with the authorization from the Law for Internal Affairs and individual regulations which regulate the work and behavior of the Service for State and Public Security, as well as according to Article 151, one of the laws concerning criminal behavior. However, taking account of the fact that the documents from this period were eliminated, the ministry does not have the necessary data and proofs on the basis of which it would be possible to confirm basic doubts that someone had performed a criminal act premeditatively and punishable in accordance with Article 71 and 208 of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia.

Besides that, up to now not one citizen, not one member of the VMRO-DPMNE Party or its party newspaper, so far consider themselves to be injured; they have not submitted a criminal complaint to the authorized public prosecutor or to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in connection with the distribution of the fliers, which is one of the formal conditions for carrying out a criminal proceeding and taking the necessary actions.

In addition to this, discovering and revealing the perpetrators of the criminal actions in accordance with Article 21 and 208 of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia, in the sense of Article 11 of the Law for the Principles of the System of State Security, Article 1, Paragraph 1, and Article 16 of the Law for Internal Affairs, and Article 2 of the Regulations for the Operation of the State Security Service, is not within the sphere of operation of the work of the State Security Service. According to the cited definitions from the regulations, the State Security Service uses means and methods in order to acquire data and information in order to discover and prevent activities directed toward forcibly threatening or changing the constitutional order and security of the country.

Hence, in accordance with Article 2 of the Law for Monitoring the State Security Service, the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the State Security Service is authorized to carry out political monitoring and supervision of the legality of the work of the State Security Service, but is not responsible for discussing and drawing conclusions concerning matters outside the sphere of action of its laws and duties.

The commission has decided so far that it is not authorized to deal with all written and other material addressed to it, in accordance with the work register and it is necessary to direct this material to other agencies of the Assembly or to the responsible state agencies.

#### The "Blue Bird" Affair

On the basis of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia (Article 204 and 218), the legal authorizations of the SDB, Article 2 of the Regulations for Operation of the State Security Service ("Official Journal of the Republic of Macedonia—Special Official Journal No. 10/92"), as well as on the basis of Article 151 of the Law on Criminal Behavior, the SDB is obliged to take measures and activities to detect, monitor, and prevent activities aimed at forcibly threatening or destroying the constitutional order and security of the Republic.

Likewise, starting from the safety evaluations concerning the pronounced danger from conducting terrorist activities, in particular those which may provoke armed conflicts between nationalities and faiths, the offered contact with the members of the so-called "Secret Committee" of the Macedonian National Guard was accepted and a meeting was held with them on 16 April 1992 in the "Blue Bird" restaurant in Kocani.

On 15 April 1992 three citizens in the MVR on their own initiative sought contact with the leadership in the MVR in order to acquaint them with certain conditions, with mention that the same was being done in the ARM. In the course of the same day contact was made with persons in the office of *Ljubo Jovanovski* in Skopje at which *Dobri Velickovski* from the MVR was present and *Dragan Stojmanovski* from the ARM was present.

After the meeting, Stojmanovski presented certain information to Velickovski in connection with the initiative of the group, the members of the "Secret Committee" who intended to form a Macedonian National Guard.

Since *Ljubo Jovanovski*, responsible in the "Foreign Committee" for creation of the "Macedonian Army," did not agree with the actions of President Jakovlevski, who, in parallel with and with the knowledge of the leadership of VMRO-DPMNE undertook actions for combined and joint operation for creating a "free and independent Macedonia" with the pro-Bulgarian emigrant organization MPO [Macedonian Patriotic Organization] from the United States and Canada (Vanco Mihajlov of the "Center" in Rome was a long-term ideologue and coordinator of the activity), the *vrhovist* [supremist] VMRO-DPMNE (VMRO-Union of Macedonian Societies) in Sofia and the VMRO-SMD [Union of Macedonian Societies] of Macedonia, together with the Secretary, *Risto Pargov*, and *Dimko Nechevski* from Denmark, undertook activities to form a National Guard. The activities for forming the Macedonian National Guard were in Strumitsa, and formally it was formed at the meeting of the VMRO-DPMNE section in Strumitsa. Members of the Macedonia National Guard who were members of VMRO-DPMNE, because of the present *vrhovistic* movement, were cut off from the party and formed a National Guard, concerning which, according to Jovanovski, there was a record of this meeting of the VMRO-DPMNE section in Strumitsa.

Likewise, Jovanovski emphasized that the Macedonian National Guard up to now has held four meetings, and decided to inform the ARM and MVR concerning the meeting held on 16 April 1992 in Kocani.

The leadership of the MVR began by establishing the contact made on 15 April 1992, and Colonel *Dragan Stojmanovski* personally informed General *Mitre Arsovski*, head of the General Staff of the ARM.

The meeting held on 16 April 1992 in the "Blue Bird" in Kocani between members of the Macedonian National Guard and representatives of the MVR and the Security Agency of the ARM was clearly called at the request of the members of the National Guard.

In the course of the meeting, which is seen from the recorded videotape of the participants at the meeting, Velickovski and Stojmanovski informed and warned the legal consequences of forming such an organization, but that if they wanted to take part in the defense of the country against potential aggression they should join the reserve staff of the ARM in voluntary special units which would be formed on the example of all modern countries in the world.

Likewise, the incompatibility of their idea with the existence of a regular movement and the ARM was emphasized in several meetings and it was emphasized that they can only be volunteer members of the reserve staff and under a single command. Among other things the participants at the meeting discussed the influence and role of the Macedonia diaspora in the defense against the penetration of *vrhovism* into Macedonia, the susceptibility to different influences from adjacent countries, the role of the SDB, and its interests concerning the activity of the extremists, of which national affiliation was a form.

General Arsovski was informed by telephone (2100 hours on 16 April 1992) by Colonel Stojmanovski concerning the results of the meeting which had been held, on 22 April 1992 he was sent the photographic material, and the revolver and the dagger on which the oath was sworn were sent to *Risto Ristovski*, head of the Security Administration of the ARM, in order that he and Stojmanovski might send them to General Arsovski on 25 April 1992.

#### The Role of the Foreign Committee of VMRO-DPMNE

After examining all the aspects and information concerning the activity of the so-called "Macedonian National Guard" the MVR concluded that there is no basis for conducting a criminal proceeding since no preparatory action was taken nor was an attempt made to carry out any criminal act specified by the laws of the Republic of Macedonia.

For these reasons the matter was left to informing and warning this group concerning the legal consequences of potential activities of this kind, which effectively achieved the preventative purpose of prohibiting such activities.

The videotape shown also was the reason for the letters of eight citizens present at the meeting in the "Blue Bird" (announced under the heading of "Letters" in NOVA MAKEDONIJA of 24 July 1992) and in the "report" to Macedonian television in which the views and evaluations of the direct participants were presented to the Republic in connection with this case, which VMRO-DPMNE is using for political marketing of the party.

The intention of a group of citizens uninfluenced by *vrhovistic* forces to organize themselves for the defense of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia at a time when military conflicts are escalating on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] still was present in Macedonia, power is misused by VMRO-DPMNE, since this is not in complete agreement with the directives of the "Foreign Committee" of VMRO-DPMNE.

Because this group took care not to do wrong in its idea, it sought and established contact with the ARM and the MVR, and after the meeting the initiative for forming a Macedonia National Guard ceased, which was influenced by the unexplained connections and intentions of Ljubo Jovanovski with the secretary of VMRO-DPMNE, Boris Zmejkovski, and the founders of VMRO-DPMNE, *Dragan Bogdanovski* and *Dimko Nechevski*, since on the one hand the party was built by them, and they collaborated together with the latter.

Taking account of the fact that, in addition to the meetings of the initiative committee for forming the Macedonia National Guard, its members did not take any preliminary extreme actions, and informed the ARM and MVR of the initiative, they emphasize that the accusations of Ljupco Georgievski that it is a matter of terrorists who probably were organized by the ARM and the MVR are inaccurate and tendentious and it is considered that their goal is political marketing of VMRO-DPMNE.

#### "A Den!"

In connection with the letter and the request of the VMRO-DPMNE delegate group to the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the State Security Service to examine the work of the SDB, in particular from the aspect of the eventual use

of particular facilities and methods of the service against the VMRO-DPMNE, that is, as is reported in the letter, monitoring the telephone at the party meeting, the commission in a decision of 16 October 1992 formed a working group including the president and secretary of the commission, which on 22 and 23 October 1992 met at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, examined the documents of the service and took the necessary actions in connection with that. At the same time, the working group did not confirm the statements of the letter of the deputy group and members of the commission and VMRO-DPMNE delegates that the telephone in the party meeting was monitored.

According to the inspection of the documents of the service, the register numbers of the documents sent from the president of VMRO-DPMNE, Mr. Ljupco Georgievski, and in the letter of the deputy group—evidence No. 178 of 19 February 1992, evidence No. 180 of 21 February 1992, and evidence No. 218 of 2 April 1992, refer to objects of operational activity of the service introduced in November 1991, according to the behavior and principles established in the Law and Regulations of the Service, and not to the VMRO-DPMNE political party.

Namely, on the basis of more knowledge and data of the service that certain people, citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, are in contact with organizations or services from abroad and the Security Service of the JNA, which during this period had pronounced activity in Macedonia, and they discussed organization of territorial activities in Macedonia intended to provoke internationality and interfaith conflicts, with the ultimate purpose of involving the Republic of Macedonia in the war and threatening its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, on the basis of Article 16 of the Law for Internal Affairs, Article 24 of the Law Concerning the Principles of the System of State Security, and Article 60 of the Regulations for the Operation of the State Security Service, of the proposal of the under secretary of the Service, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Jordan Mijalkov, made a decision to carry out operational activity over the course of a year as one of the forms of operation of the SDB when complicated and complex activities are in question. So independent or combined facilities and methods of the service were used within the framework of the operational activity, which included monitoring telephone conversations of two people abroad who are mentioned under a pseudonym in the report of the working group of the commission. The result of the successful performance of the operational activity was to reveal the activities of several units or groups who were introducing weapons, ammunition, military equipment, medical, and other material to be used in the case of theoretical actions or in conditions of war, the majority of which are manifested criminally. Likewise the attempts of the Security Service of the former JNA and of foreign intelligence and security services to organize terrorist and other activities directed toward threatening the security of the Republic have been successfully prevented. The action is still ongoing and evaluation of the service is that it must be continued as part of the total function of the service during the near future, since there still are threats of this type and plans of individual organizations or foreign services, and also units from the Republic of Macedonia for organizing and undertaking this type of activity.

When the facilities and methods of the service are used, when they are used against a specific person or object in the country

it is possible that a person from Macedonia who communicates with them will be included. However, this does not mean that the measure is directed against him. The measures taken by the Service in these cases are not in question, but primarily it is a problem of the political party which initiated this, because certain of its members are in contact with units, organizations, or foreign services which undertake activities directed towards threatening or forcibly destroying the established order and security of the Republic. It is not in accordance with the law and the decision of the commission in connection with the use of individual facilities and methods of the service in this case, in which the commission called upon Article 23 of the Law for Internal Affairs.

Namely, this article underwent changes with the Law for Changing and Supplementing the Law for Internal Affairs ("Official Journal of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 36/91"). According to Article 1 of the changes, when it is a question of conducting a criminal proceeding or of the safety of the country, at the proposal of the minister, the court having authority decides to take definite measures in which it retreats from the principle of the inviolability of the secrecy of letters and other communications facilities. This decision was in force after the passage of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and the Constitutional Law. According to Article 5 of the Constitutional Law, existing federal regulations are taken over as Republic regulations. According to the definition of Article 24 of the Federal Law Concerning the Principles of the System of State Security (which is still used since there is no other Republic law) the minister may make decisions concerning the use of particular facilities and methods when the interests of security are in question, behaving in accordance with the law and other regulations. Likewise, the definition from Article 10 of the Changes in the Law for Internal Affairs (of 6 August 1991) is not in agreement with Article 17 of the Constitution, the definition of which is used in these cases necessarily, in accordance with Article 1 of the Constitutional Law for Implementing the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.

On the basis of that which has been said, the Ministry of Internal Affairs evaluates that the report and conclusion of the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the SDB in connection with the three cases which were the subject of the investigation of the commission are unjustified, not reasoned, and tendentious.

**[Box, p 3]**

**Bulgarian Connection**

Namely, the initiator for creating the Macedonian National Guard, Ljubo Jovanovski, of Brussels, informed Stojanovski that within the framework of the activities of the "Foreign Committee" of VMRO-DPMNE (formed in September 1991 in Berlin, Germany) at the meeting held on 4 January 1991 in Hamburg, Germany it was decided that the "Foreign Committee" of VMRO-DPMNE form a "National Army" and Jovanovski was named to be responsible for forming the army and to collect the financial resources.

For this purpose the president of the "Foreign Committee" of VMRO-DPMNE, Mane Jakovlevski of Berlin, and the secretary, Risto Pargov of Brussels, traveled to Bulgaria several times where they held negotiations with representatives of the Bulgarian Army in order to obtain military assistance for Macedonia to achieve independence. In the

conversations which were held with the Bulgarian general (he declared himself to be a "Macedonian Bulgarian") they were offered the direct assistance of 10,000 specially trained soldiers for action in Macedonia, who would be "Macedonian-Bulgarian" volunteers from Bulgaria as far as the international public was concerned.

Also participating at these contacts was Metodija Dimov from Brussels (a long time close collaborator of *Vanco Mihajlov*), an established collaborator of the Bulgarian Intelligence Service, with the assistance of which and with the close collaboration achieved with the vrhovist VMRO-SMD [Union of Macedonian Societies] in Sofia, "Representatives of the Foreign Committee" were accepted among the advisers of high Bulgarian officials and in several ministries.

**[Box, p 4]**

**Death Threats**

In accordance with the request and the public recording made of the meeting in the "Blue Bird," a copy of the recorded material was given to Ljubo Jovanovski of Brussels, who represented the members of the "Foreign Committee" of VMRO-DPMNE at the meeting in Belgium. Several days after his return to Belgium the President of VMRO-DPMNE, *Ljupco Georgievski*, and the General Secretary, *Boris Zmejovski*, visited his home, showed him the recorded material, and left a video copy of the "Blue Bird" meeting. However, in connection with the meeting which was held, Georgievski before those present expressed dissatisfaction with the contacts of the members of the Macedonian National Guard with "the Serbo Communist Army" and insisted that these meetings cease.

After the videocassette was made known on Macedonian television, pressure was applied to Jovanovski by the President of the "Foreign Committee" of VMRO-DPMNE, *Mane Jakovlevski*, (who attended authorized by Ljupco Georgievski to make decisions and sign) and he was threatened with physical liquidation to declare to foreign journalists that he supported the words of Ljupco Georgievski, with which Jovanovski did not agree.

**Commission Member's View**

*93BA0430A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 25 Dec 92 p 4*

**[Unattributed article: "One-Sided Statements From the Work of the Commission"]**

**[Text] Reaction of Naum Simjanovski, member of the Commission for Monitoring the State Security Service.**

**According to the constitutional and legal provisions there is no obstacle and the presence of the member of the State Security Service at the meeting in the "Blue Bird" restaurant is justified.**

Naum Simjanovski, a member of the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the State Security Service, reported to the public with respect to the report of the commission which was issued on 21 December 1992, concerning its work in connection with the request of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity] group of 15 July 1992 and the proposal submitted on the part of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ljubomir Frchkovski, of 13 July 1992.

In the report he says that as a member of this commission, "I participated actively in its work, from the first meeting held (15 July 1992) right up to the last session (16 December 1992) when the report was approved and submitted, and I declare that the other ideas expressed by its members were not taken account in the work of the commission. Simply, there was a coalition between the members of the VMRO-DPMNE and the member of the PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity-National Democratic Party]."

Just to familiarize the public with the situation, I wish to emphasize the composition of the commission, which consists of three deputies from the deputy PDP-NDP group, two from the reform forces—the Liberal Party, and one from the Social Democratic Union.

In approving the report I expressed my opinion that I do not agree conceptually with the way the report was produced, and in particular, with respect to the second and third questions, indicating that it does not express the real situation. According to the documentation offered and examined on the part of the State Security Service, the actual situation in the Ministry for Internal Affairs is quite different from the conclusion of the commission (which was passed with three votes from the VMRO-DPMNE deputies and one from the PDP-NDP deputy).

In connection with the second question, the task of the commission was to examine if there is a constitutional and legal obstacle against the presence of the member of the State Security Service at the meeting in the "Blue Bird" restaurant in the vicinity of Kocani on 16 April 1992.

According to the constitutional and legal provisions there is no such obstacle and the presence of the member of the State Security Service is justified.

However, with respect to the professional course of the meeting, that is a question which needs to be the subject of an evaluation of the State Security Service itself, and is not the work of the commission. In this area, the commission, that is the members of the coalition, have overstepped their legal and professional authorizations.

In connection with the third question concerning the alleged tapping of the telephone of the VMRO-DPMNE, the members of VMRO-DPMNE and PDP-NDP in the commission did not have respect for the report of the working group, headed by the president of the commission himself. According to this report, the allegations and declarations of the VMRO-DPMNE political party in connection with this matter are not confirmed.

According to the way in which the commission worked, without respect for the proofs and facts which were presented and with an erroneous application of the law, the commission itself is placed in the position of a party judge of the VMRO-DPMNE and PDP-NDP political coalition.

#### View of RSM-LP

93BA0428D Skopje PULS in Macedonian 24 Dec 92 p 20

[Unattributed article; from the Platform of the Reform Forces of Macedonia-Liberal Party, RSM-LP, for Action of the Parliamentary Majority on Certain Basic Questions: "Police-Political Power"]

[Text] *The Liberals for the Ministry of Internal Affairs*

We think that the current formulation, structure, and scope of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began as a typical creation of the concept of the state in socialism as it really existed. A long time ago the police did not have so much influence in the formation of political life and the "creation" of the political atmosphere in the country. In one way or another with their political evaluation or political vision the police are widely present in the economy, in certain political parties, and even on certain editorial boards. Of course, this manner of behavior of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the enormous power it has do not contribute to more successful functioning of the government, on the contrary, it will certainly lead to a serious atrophy of all democratic processes in the country.

Therefore we think that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has to be restructured fundamentally. It must be allowed to keep only responsibility for maintaining public order and peace, and everything else has to be separated from it and assigned to the other basic ministries, such as the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Judiciary, and Administration, or independent offices or agencies should be founded (such as the intelligence service or the service for registering motor vehicles and giving driving tests).

Actually, it is necessary to set up the whole area as it is set up in the Western democratic countries. The most troubling issue up to now is the fact that one year after the passage of the constitution there is no program for reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but, on the contrary, everything is proceeding to strengthen its old concept. Therefore we insist that the government pass a basic program for reorganizing the current Ministry of Internal Affairs, at most in two months. However, the decision to pass and establish this program has to be a condition for confidence in the government.

#### View of VMRO-DPMNE

93BA0430B Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 25 Dec 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Urgent Discussion Concerning the Report of the State Security Service"]

[Text] Concerning the public report of the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the State Security Service [SDB] on the one hand, and on the other hand the denials made by the representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with respect to the findings of the commission, VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] yesterday issued an announcement in which it proposes that the report of the parliamentary commission be delivered to the deputies and be examined at a special session of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia which will be broadcast by the information media.

The institutions of the Macedonian government and its leadership openly speak of preparedness in the report, and expose the illegalities and contradictory action of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ljubomir Frchkovski, and certain officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, will answer if they are for the development of democracy in Macedonia and for the restoration of a legal government. The end of the report states that the foreign and domestic public and the Macedonian people and the citizens themselves are left to judge the actual condition.

### View of VMRO-DP

93BA0430C Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA  
in Macedonian 25 Dec 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "The Parliament Will Discuss the Report of the State Security Service"]

[Text] In the report which the VMRO-DP [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party] has made public it seeks a special session of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia at which the report of the Commission for Monitoring the Work of the State Security will be discussed, that is, the answer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs about this made via the public information media.

At the same time it is emphasized that "we call upon the VMRO-DPMNE [Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] to publically express itself concerning the statements made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that it wanted foreign military intervention in the Republic of Macedonia, for the sake of which it established contacts with the army of neighboring Bulgaria."

The report says that if the Ministry of Internal Affairs does not confirm the reported assertions with proofs, the VMRO Democratic Party will insist on basic reconstruction of the State Security of the Republic of Macedonia and strengthening the corresponding procedure for handling the criminal responsibility for the responsible persons of the state institution.

### Results of Macedonian Opinion Poll Published

93BA0421A Skopje PULS in Macedonian  
17 Dec 92 pp 14-15

[Report by Zvezdan Georgievski, PULS Research Center: "Landing in Edinburgh"]

[Text] *In a time of intensive politicization, the rating of politicians indicates that their popularity among the people is drastically declining. The greatest decline is that of Vasil Tupurkovski, followed by Stojan Andov, while the members of the government remain anonymous to most respondents. Kiro Gligorov retains the leading and Ljupco Georgievski holds the lowest position.*

The most popular politicians in Macedonia are those who have lost their popularity the least. This is the first conclusion of the results of the fourth annual popularity rating of Macedonian leading politicians, traditionally conducted by the PULS Research Center.

This time, one of the basic survey features was the period during which it was conducted: between 10 and 12 December, the weekend during which the Macedonian public, still under the impression of the stormy parliamentary session that debated the motion by President Kiro Gligorov for the word Skopje to be added to the name of the Republic, impatiently awaited the results of the European Edinburgh summit.

Nonetheless, once again the 400 respondents put in a leading position among the most popular Macedonian politicians (as was the case, actually, in all previous PULS political popularity polls) Kiro Gligorov. However, what is striking is the fact that the president, although retaining the leading position and, judging by the number of points, the same distance from the second most popular individual, Foreign Relations Minister Denko Maleski, has lost some popularity compared to

the previous survey, by a full 360 points. The fact that the leading position was assigned by a high percentage of people who are very pleased with Gligorov (42.25 percent or 169 respondents) compared to their previous support (46.5 percent and 186 respondents) indicates that in the eyes of the Macedonian citizens the credit of the president has by no means been spent. On the contrary, the policy of rationality is supported by the Macedonian population.

The loss of popularity of the second most popular person, Minister Denko Maleski, may be interpreted as a result of the parliamentary debates and the relative lack of success of Macedonian diplomacy in Edinburgh. However, also important here is what applies to the president of the Republic, i.e., that despite the dragging nonrecognition, the work of Denko Maleski was highly favored by 106 respondents (26.5 percent), while 187 (46.75 percent) were quite pleased, which proves that the foreign policy of the Republic, despite all criticism addressed at it, and at the personality of the minister, is nonetheless given a positive rating.

Third on the list is independent representative Todor Petrov (fourth in the previous rating). Petrov was able to improve his popularity rating despite a drop in the favorable assessment he obtained in the previous survey. Petrov's high rating is a surprise, particularly if we keep in mind that he is not backed by any political party and that, personally, in addition to his position as representative, he does not hold any function within the state apparatus.

Immediately under him is representative Petar Gosev (eighth in the previous rating). In this case as well, his high position does not imply that his evaluation, compared to the previous survey, has improved, although Gosev remains one of the rare politicians who, to a certain extent at least, was able to retain the same percentage of approval as given to him in the previous survey. Although he represents the most powerful party in the coalition government, one could say in his case as well that his popularity is inconsistent with the position he holds in the governmental and party hierarchy.

Unlike the politicians we named, Stojan Andov, the parliament's chairman, shows a loss of two positions (he was third in the previous rating) for the simple reason that the decline in his percentile rating is greater than that of his "competitors" (690 in the previous rating and 485 in the present one). Although essentially his rating is positive, his popularity decline may be due to the inefficiency of the institution, which is frequently linked to Andov's name.

As a whole, the rating of the members of the coalition government has been relatively poor. Most popular among the members of the coalition government is Ljubomir Frckovski, the minister of internal affairs, who is in sixth place. Unlike him, Deputy Chairman Jovan Andonov is ninth, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski is 10th, and Stevo Crvenkovski, the other deputy chairman, is 12th (the list includes 15 politicians). The results indicate that, actually, the respondents are less familiar with the personalities of the members of the government than have a poor opinion of them. Thus, for example, 155 respondents had no opinion about Jovan Andonov (38.75 percent); 69 had no opinion about Branko Crvenkovski (17.25 percent), and 187 respondents, or 46.75 percent of the total, had no opinion about Stevo Crvenkovski.

Unlike the members of the government, an absolute drop in popularity is shown by Vasil Tupurkovski (sixth in the previous rating), who was 13th with 40 points (50 respondents expressed very favorable feelings about him; 108 were favorable, 124 had a negative opinion of him, 34 had a very negative opinion, and 84 had no opinion).

Quite definitely last and the only ones with negative ratings are Estref Aliu (- 412.5) and Ljupco Georgievski (- 570). This poor result may be interpreted as a consequence of the ethnic trend personified by these two politicians.

Nonetheless, it is impossible to ignore Edinburgh and what happened in and around it in terms of drawing conclusions from the survey. Following the nonrecognition of Macedonia, the best that could be expected was precisely what happened: a general decline in popularity, a critical view on the policy and politicians, and a drop in the exalted feelings motivated by the various political trends in the Republic.

Traditionally, the PULS Research Center surveys public opinion of individuals in other "public" areas, within the framework of political rating. After Darko Pancev, Blaze Koneski, and Vlatko Stefanovski, on this occasion the rating of Ljupco Nikolovski, owner of a chain of Dal Fufo pizzerias, was determined. Unlike his predecessors, whose ratings were quite high, this promoter of fast food in Macedonia had a rating of 177.5, which puts him in the 12th position. What is most characteristic in this case, however, is the greater anonymity of Macedonian private businessmen. Thus, for example, as many as 300 out of the 400 respondents had no opinion about Ljupco Nikolovski, which meant that, generally speaking, they could not identify him.

[Box, p 14]

#### Positive Rating of Gligorov's Policies

Within the framework of the popularity poll of politicians during the holding of the European Community summit in Edinburgh, the PULS Research Center asked the respondents the following: "How do you rate President Gligorov's overall policy?" The same question was posed previously by the center on 4 and 5 December, the results of which were published in our weekly.

The results obtained after Edinburgh are somewhat different, compared to the previous ones. In the first survey more than one-half of the respondents (50.67 percent) had a very favorable opinion of Gligorov's policy, whereas one week later, in connection with the parliament session and after Edinburgh, the same opinion was expressed by 38.25 percent. The policy of the Assembly president was rated favorably by 39.33 percent in the first survey compared with 43.75 percent in the second. Negative views were expressed by 4.33 percent in the first survey and 10.50 percent in the second. The number of people whose views concerning Gligorov's policies were very negative doubled compared to the previous poll. They amounted to 1.33 percent in the first survey compared to 2.50 in the second. Finally, people with no opinion amounted to 4.33 percent in the first and 5 percent in the second.

#### Comparison of Opinion Polls

	4-5 December	10-12 December
Very favorable	50.67%	38.25%
Favorable	39.33%	43.75%
Unfavorable	4.33%	10.50%
Very unfavorable	1.33%	2.50%
No opinion	4.33%	5.00%

#### Breakdown of Respondents

	Number	Percentage
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	186	46.5
Female	214	53.5
<b>Age</b>		
18-29	107	26.75
30-49	187	46.75
50 and older	106	26.5
<b>Education</b>		
Primary	48	12
Secondary	216	54
Higher	136	34
<b>Work Status</b>		
Inactive	159	39.75
State-municipal sector	190	47.5
Private sector	51	12.75

#### Ratings of Politicians

K. Gligorov	1,185
D. Maleski	762.5
T. Petrov	530
P. Gosev	492.5
S. Andov	485
Lj. Frckovski	332.5
B. Handziski	320
Gj. Marjanovic	292.5
J. Andonov	262.5
B. Crvenkovski	225
A. Popovski	175
S. Crvenkovski	122.5
V. Tupurkovski	40
E. Aliu	- 412.5
Lj. Georgievski	- 570

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